

# Market Analysis

Issue No. 446

www.stockmarket.co.nz

August 10, 2009

## Inside Market Analysis

CDL Investments, Renaissance Corporation,  
Atlas South Sea Pearls all trade around  
break-even in economic downturn ..... 3, 4

BUY Village Roadshow  
"A" Class Preference shares ..... 7, 8, 9

An Investment Strategy:  
Writing Covered Call Options ..... 12,13

Australian Warrant / Option Analysis ..... 13,14

Founder: James R Cornell (B.Com.)

## Summary and Recommended Investment Strategy.

Share valuations are low, stockmarkets are recovering, money is flowing back into equities and the economic downturn wasn't anywhere near as bad as many feared! This is the perfect situation for shares to rally very strongly over the next year or longer. Remain fully invested in the recommended shares.

## Investment Outlook.

### Stockmarket Forecasts

In January this year we pointed out how the third biggest (and the most rapid) rally on the US stockmarket occurred during the Great Depression - when the market rose 372% (36% per annum) from 1932 to 1937.

We were always sceptical that the recent economic downturn would be "worse than the Great Depression" . . . but fear in the market had driven shares to a similar low extreme of valuation. In January we wrote "Share valuations are just too low to ignore. From these low levels, shares should yield far above average future returns *even in a Depression!*".

Stockmarkets (as we now know) continued to fall for another two months - but have rallied strongly since early March.


Commentators (i.e. those people with no shares and no net wealth, but who wish to share their superior insight with us little guys) have called this a *Fool's Rally*. A major correction (i.e. to allow people who sold out at the bottom to get back in the market) has been widely expected and predicted . . . although readers of this newsletter should know by now that the market does the *opposite* of what is widely expected.

If investors are sitting with cash, waiting for a correction to buy back into shares, then every sign of weakness will be met by new buying and prices will keep on going up. Investors who sold out at the bottom will still be sitting on the sidelines looking for a buying opportunity as share prices continue to soar.

So, where to next for the stockmarket? Share prices are volatile, so some type of correction is always likely . . . but it is probably not a good idea to hold your breath waiting for a big dip! Around the world, money is flowing back into equity funds and stockmarkets. With the massive quantities of extra liquidity injected into financial markets by Central Banks, this flow into equities and other financial assets is likely to continue for some time. In fact, it *could* lead to significant inflation in financial asset prices - which

(Continued on Page 15)

	One-Month	One-Year
Australia:	92% (Bullish)	80% (Bullish)
New Zealand:	89% (Bullish)	72% (Bullish)





# Recommended Investments

**CDL Investments** suffered an 80.1% drop in revenues for the six months to 30 June 2009. The company sold just three residential sections during the period, compared with 20 in the first half of 2008 and 108 in the first half of 2007. As a result the company suffered a small loss of \$31,000 (compared with a small profit of \$1,481,000 in the first half of 2008 and a profit of \$7.6 million in the first half of 2007).

There was a cash operating *deficit* of \$1.1 million, a slight improvement on the *deficit* of \$1.5 million a year earlier.

CDL Investments is, however, debt free and has \$4.0 million in cash and has reduced development expenditure in line with the lower demand for properties. So there is no risk of failure and the company can just hold its valuable undeveloped land bank (*Continued on Page 4*)

## Portfolio of Recommended Investments

CURRENT ADVICE	Company	Code	Initial - Date -	Recommendation Price	Perform- mance Forecast	Issued Shares (mil.)	Vola- tility Ratio	Price/ Sales Ratio	Price/ Earnings Ratio	Gross Dividend Yield	Recent Share Price	Cash Dividends Rec'd	Total Return %
<u>NZ Shares</u>													
HOLD	CDL Investments Ltd	CDI	12/01/99	25	E	243.4	1.4	14.04	36	Nil	25	17.9	+72%
HOLD+	Cavalier Corporation	CAV	05/12/95	156*	A	67.1	0.8	0.61	9	13.1	228	230.0	+194%
HOLD	Colonial Motor Company	CMO	10/11/92	150	B	27.9	0.5	0.13	9	14.6	235	344.8	+287%
HOLD	Lyttelton Port Company	LPC	12/12/00	150	C	102.3	0.7	2.94	24	3.2	240	69.9	+107%
BUY	Michael Hill Int'l Ltd	MHI	11/06/91	5*	B	382.5	0.8	0.71	11	6.8	70	26.4	+1828%
HOLD+	Nuplex Industries Ltd	NPX	11/02/97	131*	C	163.4	0.7	0.57	2	2.8	200	89.6	+121%
HOLD	Postie Plus Group	PPG	08/05/06	71	C	40.0	1.3	0.11	NE	Nil	37	8.5	-36%
HOLD	Renaissance Corp	RNS	13/08/96	85*	C	44.9	1.6	0.07	4	14.4	31	53.9	-0%
HOLD	Smiths City Group	SCY	09/10/06	64	C	53.0	1.5	0.08	18	5.9	34	11.0	-30%
HOLD	South Port New Zealand	SPN	13/02/96	120	C	26.2	0.7	4.03	25	6.0	236	108.3	+187%
HOLD	Steel & Tube Holdings	STU	08/08/00	146	C	88.2	0.7	0.56	13	8.9	320	222.0	+271%
HOLD+	Taylors Group Ltd	TAY	09/11/99	102	A	24.3	0.7	0.62	18	10.0	179	92.0	+166%
<u>Australian Shares</u> (in Aust cents)													
BUY	AJ Lucas Group	AJL	13/05/03	120	B	59.3	0.7	0.47	15	2.1	338	35.5	+211%
HOLD+	Atlas South Sea Pearl	ATP	14/05/96	73	C	120.1	2.3	0.52	NE	22.2	9	17.5	-64%
HOLD	Breville Group Ltd	BRG	13/11/06	171	A	129.5	0.8	0.31	6	10.2	103	14.5	-32%
HOLD	Campbell Brothers Ltd	CPB	12/10/99	406*	A	53.0	0.3	1.38	12	4.2	2390	457.6	+601%
HOLD	Cellnet Group Ltd <sup>1</sup>	CLT	12/02/02	147*	C	76.8	1.4	0.05	NE	Nil	28	32.4	-53%
BUY	Challenger Wine Trust	CWT	12/01/09	30	C	170.3	1.2	1.69	NE	21.5	33	2.4	+18%
HOLD	Charter Hall Group	CHC	06/04/09	30*	A	532.3	1.1	2.19	3	26.8	47	Nil	+57%
HOLD	Circadian Technologies	CIR	10/02/04	188	D	40.1	0.9	3.69	NE	Nil	75	65.0	-26%
BUY	Clarius Group Ltd	CND	08/04/03	86	A	57.4	1.0	0.11	3	25.0	64	68.5	+54%
BUY	CPT Global Ltd	CGO	10/03/08	88	A	36.9	1.0	0.46	12	9.1	55	4.3	-33%
HOLD+	Devine Ltd	DVN	13/11/06	94	C	285.7	1.1	0.24	4	16.3	49	19.0	-28%
HOLD+	Ellex Medical Lasers	ELX	14/03/06	49	C	102.8	1.8	0.22	6	Nil	17	Nil	-66%
BUY	Fiducian Portfolio Ser	FLS	11/02/08	260	A	32.8	0.9	1.77	8	8.7	150	10.3	-38%
HOLD	Iluka Resources Ltd	ILU	12/10/04	471	D	380.7	0.6	2.16	20	Nil	325	64.0	-17%
BUY	Integrated Research	IRI	14/01/08	40	A	166.5	1.1	1.85	12	7.2	42	4.5	+15%
HOLD-	Int'l AllSports	IAS	11/02/03	180	C	66.4	1.1	0.86	NE	Nil	59	4.0	-65%
BUY	M2 Telecommunications	MTU	09/10/06	33	A	78.9	0.9	0.58	12	6.3	80	10.5	+174%
HOLD	Mercury Brands Ltd	MCB	08/02/05	93	D	310.9	6.8	0.02	NE	Nil	1	7.0	-91%
HOLD	Mercury Mobility <sup>1</sup>	MMY			C	105.0	3.2	0.81	NE	Nil	5.0	Nil	
HOLD	Melbourne IT	MLB	10/02/04	53	B	78.0	0.6	0.82	9	7.7	195	51.0	+364%
HOLD+	Photon Group Ltd	PGA	10/11/08	140	B	102.8	0.6	0.29	7	13.3	215	6.0	+58%
HOLD+	Probiotec Ltd	PBP	11/02/08	116	B	46.6	0.6	1.52	16	1.2	214	3.8	+88%
BUY	Prophecy International	PRO	08/09/08	26	A	45.1	1.1	4.24	13	7.3	55	2.0	+119%
HOLD	Ross Human Directions	RHD	14/08/01	92	B	83.5	1.6	0.04	4	17.5	20	33.3	-42%
BUY	Skilled Group Ltd	SKE	12/03/02	126	B	122.0	0.7	0.11	5	13.6	169	130.5	+138%
HOLD+	Technology One Ltd	TNE	11/11/03	44	A	298.9	0.8	2.30	15	4.8	85	17.2	+132%
BUY	TFS Corporation Ltd	TFC	08/01/07	45	A	187.3	0.8	3.04	8	3.6	111	5.2	+158%
HOLD+	The Reject Shop Ltd	TRS	11/01/05	257	A	25.7	0.3	0.95	20	3.7	1300	158.5	+468%
BUY	Village Roadshow PREF	VRLPA	10/08/09	77	B	224.9	0.8	0.13	3	25.3	77	Nil	

The average Total Return (i.e. both Capital Gains/Losses plus Dividends received) of all current investments from initial recommendation is +139.0%. This is equal to an average annual rate of +21.6%, based upon the length of time each position has been held.

The average annual rate of gain of ALL recommendations (both the 40 current and 144 closed out) is +29.2%, compared with a market gain of +4.8% (by the SRC Total Return Index).

CURRENT ADVICE is either Buy, Hold+, Hold, Hold- or Sell. Hold+ indicates the most attractive shares not rated as Buy. Hold- indicates relatively less attractive issues.

\* Initial Recommendation Prices adjusted for Share Splits, Bonus and Cash Issues.

(1) Cellnet Group return includes 1½ shares in Mercury Mobility distributed to shareholders.

## Recommended Investments

(Continued from Page 3)

until the market improves.

The company expects “some sales activity” in the second half of this year which will result in a small annual profit.

### CDL Investments



**Lyttelton Port Company** has lodged a resource consent application to expand its coal yard to handle the expected future growth in coal exports.

### Lyttelton Port Company



**Renaissance Corporation** reports a 0.5% decline in revenues to \$94.6 million for the six months to 30 June, but profits fell 87.1% to just \$189,000 (0.4 cent per share).

There was, however, a net operating cash surplus of \$2.9 million, compared with a *deficit* of \$8.1 million in the

### Renaissance Corporation



same period the previous year.

Margins were reduced and the company incurred costs opening a new *MagnumMac* store in Christchurch which began trading in July (so contributed no revenues to the first half result). Trading conditions are expected to remain difficult and much of the company's result depends upon trading in the December quarter, but it expects to earn an annual net profit of around \$1.2-1.4 million (2.7-3.1 cents per share).

### Australian Shares

(This section is in Australian currency, unless stated.)


**Atlas South Sea Pearl** estimates its first half revenues to 30 June will be about 60% lower at \$3.1 million, while pre-tax profits will fall 66% to around \$2.04 million. That result includes a foreign exchange gain of \$1.5 million - so the business is operating at around a break-even level in the current downturn.

The company reports that pearl prices have fallen about 40% over the last year, while the industry has suffered a 60% reduction in sales volumes!

Atlas South Sea Pearl reports that “no further debts have been incurred in 2009” and that it has a “strong balance sheet” after raising \$2.9 million in its cash issue in April. The company has achieved “reductions in operating costs and realised savings from improvements in efficiencies in pearl farm operations” while meeting its targets with the number of oysters seeded and quantity of oysters on hand.

While “the outlook for the pearl market remains uncertain for the remainder of 2009” it is widely expected that “global pearl production will be reduced over the next two years” (i.e. as higher cost, less efficient competitors go out of business). Atlas South Sea Pearl aims to maintain production levels and will seek to sell pearls through wholesale markets as well as to further expand the manufacture and sale of wholesale jewellery.

### Atlas South Sea Pearl



**Campbell Brothers** reports “very challenging” trading during April and May, but a stronger performance in June. As a result the company expects its first half profits to 30 September to be down 30-40% to around \$35-40 million (66-75 cents per share).


The company, however, has sought to reduce costs and expenditure in line with market conditions. Staff

numbers have been cut 32% and capital expenditure reduced by 74%. Working capital has been reduced, with a focus on stock levels and debtors.

Campbell Brothers has also developed a five year strategic plan and will focus upon growth in the testing market for Minerals, Environmental, Life Sciences, Agriculture and some of the Industrial sectors of the A\$95 billion global Testing, Inspection and Certification market. It is also planning to expand from just a *testing* business to a *testing and inspection* business over that period.

Despite weakness in the current resource downturn, Campbell Brothers is targeting double digit annual growth over the next five years. The shares, however, have recovered very strongly over the last several months so we are downgrading them to a "Hold".

**Campbell Brothers**



**Challenger Wine Trust** increased revenues 2.3% to \$33.5 million over the year to 30 June 2009. Trading profits were up 0.8% to \$16,137,000 (9.5 cents per share). The \$39.7 million *decline* in the market value of properties and interest rate swaps, however, reduced the bottom line result to a *loss* of \$24,331,000. A final 1.2 cents per unit quarterly distribution takes the annual payout to 7.1 cents per unit.

The net operating cash surplus was 15% lower at \$15.0 million - before paying \$4.4 million to cover losses on interest rate swaps that were closed.

All of the trust's tenants paid their rent in full, but there may be some problem this year with listed **Australian Vintage** which leases one-third of the trust's assets. The trust is presently reviewing "rental support options" with Australian Vintage.

The trust expects "ongoing pressure on the vineyard sector over the next two to three years" with the Australian grape market moving "towards longer term supply/demand balance" over that period as further Australian vineyards are removed.

The trust is not directly exposed to this downturn, with its properties on leases averaging 5.0 years. No leases expire during the current financial year to June 2010, with 15.1% of leases expiring in the June 2011 year and just 4.2% in the year to June 2012. The industry should be in recovery by the time most leases come up for renewal and annual rentals are re-negotiated.

The trust is, however, impacted by depressed vineyard

asset values which puts pressure on its bank covenants. There could also be cashflow problems if wine company tenants cannot pay lease rentals on time. Nevertheless, these problems have depressed the unit price to only about 3½ times its annual net income and half of the currently depressed market value of its net assets. In the short term the trust may need to divert its \$14-17 million net operating cash flows from paying distributions to investors to repaying debts - or in an extreme case, raising some additional equity - but strengthening the balance sheet should help to re-rate the value of the units.

Successful asset sales would reduce debt levels and improve the trust's balance sheet and loan covenant ratios.


Challenger Wine Trust is continuing to negotiate to sell properties to reduce debt and future distributions will be subject to financial conditions. Having already reduced distributions (from around 100% of earnings, to 50%) the trust will move from quarterly distributions to half yearly distributions in the immediate future.

The net independent value of the trust's assets declined from \$161.0 million (94 cents per unit) at June 2008 to \$112.9 million (66 cents per unit) at June 2009 - owing to the fall in property values and the mark to market losses on interest rate swaps (i.e. as interest rates fell sharply). At 33 cents the units trade at a 50% discount to the current market value of the trust's net assets!

The June quarter distribution - payable 17 August - of 1.2 cents will consist of 0.555 cents of Australian income subject to foreign withholding tax (at 22½% for NZ investors) and 0.645 cents of other income not subject to foreign withholding taxes.

All equity investments involve some risk and while Challenger Wine Trust faces some uncertainty in the short to medium term, this a relatively low risk business that is well financed and owns income producing assets, on long leases, generating strong cash flows. As part of a diversified portfolio, the units are an attractive investment. Over the next 2-3 years the vineyard assets will recover in value, with the trust being able to return to annual distributions of around 9 cents (i.e. yielding 27% on the current unit price) and the unit will likely be re-rated to around 75-85 cents (i.e. up 125-160%). "Buy".

**Challenger Wine Trust**




(Continued on Page 6)

**Recommended Investments**

*(Continued from Page 5)*

**Devine** is restructuring its Housing and Land Divisions into one national division to oversee its operations in Queensland, Victoria and New South Wales, which will “cut costs by eliminating duplication”.

**Devine**



**Fiducian Portfolio Services** reports June 2009 quarter receipts of \$5,469,000 - down 23% on the same period the previous year. Annual receipts are 22% lower at \$24.0 million.

The June 2009 quarterly net operating cash surplus of \$876,000 was down 46% on the June 2008 quarter, while the annual net operating cash surplus was also 46% lower at \$3.2 million.

Cash on hand is \$7.8 million (24 cents per share).

**Fiducian Portfolio Services**



**Integrated Research** announced its June 2009 result would show “significant growth in profits” immediately prior to our July newsletter - which we estimated could put the annual profit at \$7.9-8.9 million. The company then confirmed its own profit estimate in the range \$7-8 million (4.2-4.8 cents per share). The actual result will be released this week on 13 August.


**Integrated Research**



**International All Sports** will hold a shareholders meeting on 14 September to approve the scheme of arrangement under which **Sportsbet** will acquire the company for 60 cents per share in cash. The scheme will become effective - and payment will be made - on 1 October.

Investors not wanting to wait two months for payment could sell the shares on-market now for about 58 cents.

**International All Sports**



**Skilled Group** is restructuring its business into three divisions: *Staffing Services*, *Engineering & Marine Services* and *Business Services*. This is expected to generate further annual cost savings of around \$4 million annually, in addition to the \$40 million annual cost savings (mainly from downsizing overheads in line with current market demand) achieved in the year to June 2009.

**Skilled Group**



# *Share Recommendation:*

## *Buy Village Roadshow*

### *“A” Class Preference shares*

#### **BUY Village Roadshow “A” Class Preference shares (code VRLPA).**

**Village Roadshow** is a diversified entertainment company involved in five businesses: Theme Parks, Film Production, Film Distribution, Cinema Exhibition and Radio. The “A” Class Preference shares offer a very high income yield and (like the ordinary shares) will participate fully in any recovery and growth by the company.

#### **Company History**

The company was formed in 1986 as **De Laurentiis Entertainment** to produce and finance motion pictures. The company listed on the Australian stockmarket following a public offer of 55.0 million shares at 50 cents in January 1987.

In September 2007 the group merged its film production business, **Village Roadshow Pictures Group**, with **Concord Music Group** to form **Village Roadshow Entertainment Group**. This business is 39.9% owned by Village Roadshow, 48.0% by Concord Entertainment and 12.1% by the private equity group **Tailwind Capital**.

Film distribution is conducted through **Roadshow Distributors Group** - a 50% joint venture with **Amalgamated Holdings** for 20 years until August 2007 when Village Roadshow acquired full ownership of this business.

In 1992, the company expanded into Theme Parks through a joint venture with **Warner Bros. Inc** to acquire **Sea World Property Trust** and this venture expanded with the acquisition and development of other parks. In May 2006 the group bought out Warner Bros for \$254 million taking full ownership of the *Warner Bros Movie World*, *Sea World*, *Wet 'n' Wild Water World*, *Australian Outback Spectacular*, *Paradise Country*, *Sea World Aviation* and *Warner Roadshow Studios*. In September 2006 the company increased its ownership in the **Sea World Nara Resort Hotel** from 50% to 100% at a cost of \$20 million.

A 14.9% shareholding was purchased in listed **Sydney Attractions Group** (i.e. the *Sydney Aquarium*, *Oceanworld Manly*, the *Sydney Tower*, *Skywalk* and *Sydney Wildlife World*) in January 2005 and a full takeover, valuing the company at \$140 million, was completed in February 2008. Plans to acquire **Aussie World** in the Sunshine Coast and expand it into a water park for a total investment of \$60-70 million were announced in May 2008. The group expanded into the United States with the acquisition of **Hawaiian Waters** in May 2008 (for US\$27 million) and the **Phoenix Water Park** in July 2008 (for a total investment of US\$25 million, including major expansion in 2009 and

2010). **Kelly Tarlton's Antarctic Encounter and Underwater World** in Auckland was purchased in March 2008 for NZ\$13 million.

The Cinema Exhibition division grew from the November 1992 acquisition of the South East Asian multiplex cinema operations of **Village Roadshow Corporation**. This transaction gave Village Roadshow Corporation control of the listed company - which changed its name to Village Roadshow. This division expanded rapidly internationally - but with mixed success. During the late 1990's and early 2000's the group sold off its cinema interests in Hong Kong, Germany, Switzerland, France, South Korea, Thailand, India and Taiwan. The cinemas in Argentina were sold during 2005 and its cinema interests in NZ, Fiji, the United Kingdom, Italy and Austria sold during 2006. This leaves it with profitable cinema businesses in Australia (507 screens at 50 sites), Singapore (73 screens at nine sites), Czech Republic (22 screens at two sites) and Greece (62 screens at six sites) where it has management control and a dominant position in the Australian and Singapore markets.

In 1993 the group entered the radio broadcasting business with the purchase of FM radio stations from the **State Bank of New South Wales**. These radio interests were merged with listed **Austereo** in September 1994 when Village Roadshow acquired a 53.5% interest in Austereo. A full takeover bid was made for Austereo in 1997 - which Village Roadshow refloated on the stockmarket in 2001.

Village Roadshow currently owns 181,093,856 shares in **Austereo** (51.65% of the company) with a market value of \$244.5 million (or 109 cents per Village Roadshow share).

#### **Share Buy-Backs**

Over recent years, Village Roadshow has been very active at re-purchasing both its A Class Preference shares and its ordinary shares. When we previously reviewed this company in 2002 its issued capital was 236.1 million ordinary shares and 240.4 million preference shares or a total of 476.5 million equity shares. Over the last six years the company has repurchased 52.8% of its equity capital, reducing it to 126.9 million ordinary shares and 98.0 million preference shares or a total of 224.9 million shares.

In the year to June 2004 the company bought back 140.1 million A Class Preference shares on-market for a total cost of \$169 million. In the year to June 2005 the company made two on-market repurchases totalling 66.0 million ordinary shares acquired for \$140 million.

16.8 million ordinary shares and 613,333 Preference shares were repurchased *(Continued on Page 8)*

## Buy Village Roadshow Preference Shares

(Continued from Page 7)

in the year to June 2006 for \$45 million.

In the year to June 2007, 13.6 million ordinary shares and 4.5 million Preference shares were bought back on-market for \$59.3 million.

Over the year to June 2008 the company repurchased 14.1 million ordinary shares and 11.0 million Preference shares at a total cost of \$74.6 million.

### Capital Structure

Village Roadshow has an unusual capital structure with two classes of "equity" shares. There are 126,908,449 ordinary shares (code VRL) and 98,024,451 A Class Preference shares (code VRLPA). The A Class Preference shares are the most attractive for investors.

The ordinary shares have the usual voting rights and entitlement to dividends (if declared). Village Roadshow Corporation (i.e. the private company) owns 58.72% of these voting shares and has control of Village Roadshow, so the voting rights attached to the ordinary shares are of little or no value - especially to small individual shareholders.

The A Class Preference shares are effectively *non-voting ordinary* shares but also have preferential entitlements to dividends. The preference shares will receive the higher of (1) a minimum annual dividend of 10.175 cents (plus franking credits) or (2) an annual dividend 3.0 cents *higher* than paid on the ordinary shares.

The A Class preference shares also have priority on repayment of capital if the company is wound up, receiving 50 cents per share ahead of any payment on the ordinary shares, but fully participating in any capital in excess of 50 cents per share. As voting rights have little real value, these dividend and repayment rights make the preference shares *more attractive* than the ordinary shares. If the company performs poorly the preference shares will receive at least 10.175 cents (while the ordinary shareholders may receive nothing) but if the company performs well the preference shares participate fully in the growth in the dividend paid to the ordinary shareholders, plus receive an annual dividend rate 3.0 cents higher than the ordinary shares.

For some reason the market has always valued the preference shares at a discount to the ordinary shares - which further boosts their effective yield. That discount is currently at an historically high level of 35%.

The preference shares will also receive voting rights if (1) preference dividends are more than six months in arrears or (2) for any proposal to reduce the capital, wind up the company or sell the company's business. The preference shares will convert to ordinary shares in a takeover.

Both the ordinary shares and the A Class Preference shares are fairly actively traded in good volumes.

### Recent Results

For the year to June 2006, revenues rose 5.9% to \$1,541.5 million, but the company reported a *loss* of \$35,109,000 (*minus* 13.4 cents per share) - down from a \$49.3 million profit the previous year. No dividends were

declared at the time but the company paid special dividends in December 2006 of 34.0 cents per ordinary share and 37.0 cents per preference share for the 2006 financial year.

The net operating cash surplus remained very strong at \$131.7 million, up 226%.

Revenues were unchanged at \$1,538.2 million over the year to June 2007 with profits recovering to \$45,079,000 (18.2 cents per share). Dividends of 9.0 cents per ordinary share and 12.0 cents per preference share were paid, plus a capital repayment of 15.0 cents on both classes of share.

There was a net operating cash *deficit* of \$72.0 million for the period.

For the year to June 2008 the company reported revenues of \$1,311.9 million. Adjusted for the deconsolidation of the film production business (which became an associate company) revenues were up 51.3%. Profits from *continuing* operations were \$62,200,000 (27.7 cents per share) plus a \$195 million profit from the deconsolidation of the film production business. Regular dividends of 16.5 cents per ordinary share plus 19.5 cents per preference share were paid, plus a special 10.0 cents dividend on both types of share.

The half year to 31 December 2008 saw revenues increase 13.3% to \$734.0 million, but profits slipped 62.3% to \$17,059,000 (7.5 cents per share).

There was a net operating cash surplus of \$89.6 million, compared with a *deficit* of \$96.5 million in the same period a year earlier.

The company deferred declaring an interim dividend pending the refinancing of credit lines for its film production associate, Village Roadshow Entertainment Group. These negotiations took longer than expected but were finally concluded in early May (with a US\$900 million facility repayable from September 2010 to September 2012). This refinancing also reduced Village Roadshow's financial guarantees to the film production associate.

The company declared and paid an interim dividend of 3.75 cents on both classes of share.

### Divisional Contributions and Debt Levels

For the year to June 2008, Radio generated \$70.2 million to consolidated earnings (before interest, tax, depreciation and corporate overheads) but this division is only 51.6% owned, so contributed \$36.3 million (29%) to earnings of the company's shareholders. Theme Parks earned \$34.4 million (27%), Film Distribution \$36.8 million (29%) and Cinema Exhibition \$19.1 million (15%), with no earnings from the Film Production business for the period.

Film Production is, of course, a very volatile business with large fluctuations in earnings. The Radio business can also be cyclical, with profits fluctuating with advertising revenues in line with general economic conditions. Theme Parks, Film Distribution and Cinema Exhibition are relatively stable businesses, generating strong cashflows.

The company has increased its ownership of Theme Parks and Film Distribution from 50% to 100% in recent years and is focusing upon expanding Theme Parks, so this should contribute to more stable and reliable future earnings.



Village Roadshow also has relatively high consolidated (i.e. including Austereo, but excluding its 39.9% owned Village Roadshow Entertainment Group) interest bearing debts totalling \$968.9 million. High debt levels increase both the annual fluctuations and the potential future growth rate in profits. The company's debt levels are manageable owing to high earnings and cashflows which cover interest costs several times over.

#### **Investment Criteria**

At 118½ cents the ordinary shares trade on a Price/Sales ratio of 0.20, a Price/Earnings ratio of 4¼ and offer a Dividend Yield of 13.9%.

The preference shares trade at 77 cents, which is a Price/Sales ratio of 0.13, a Price/Earnings ratio of 2¾ and - owing to both the *lower price* and *higher dividend entitlement* - offer a high Dividend Yield of 25.3%.

Village Roadshow is a relatively *asset rich* company with a \$253 million (112 cents per share) investment in Austereo. Shareholders Equity is \$629.1 million (280 cents per share).

The combined market capitalisation of the ordinary and preference shares is \$226 million, making this a medium to large listed Australian company.

The combination of (manageable) high debt levels and the large discount to net assets offers significant *leverage* to investors. The company has total assets of \$2,262.7 million. That is \$10.06 per share in assets which can be bought for just 118½ or 77 cents (i.e. 12 cents or 7½ cents in the dollar). *If* the company can manage its assets and businesses well then *all* additional gains will accrue to the ordinary and preference shareholders. Ownership of the Preference shares - with their preferential entitlement to dividends and capital, plus their lower share price - minimises our investment risk.

Management have a significant holding in Village Roadshow. Directors RG Kirby, JR Kirby and GW Burke own 77,517,432 ordinary shares (mainly through Village Roadshow Corporation), while WJ Conn owns 191,563 ordinary shares, PD Jonson holds 10,000 ordinary shares and 33,236 preference shares, DB Reardon has 10,000 ordinary and 8,552 preference shares and DJ Evans owns 40,000 ordinary shares.

There have been six *insider* buys over the last year (plus a seventh very small, insignificant purchase). G W Burke purchased 200,000 at 100-110 cents, 25,000 shares at 102 cents, 75,000 shares at 102 cents and 11,009 shares at 98-99 cents in December 2008. He then purchased 12,943 shares at 99 cents and 17,968 shares at 99-100 cents in January 2009.

Over recent years, Village Roadshow has become *neglected* by brokers and only one broker currently publishes profit forecasts.

Village Roadshow shares peaked at 670 cents in February 1996 and steadily lost 85% of their value through to a low of 98 cents in March 2003. The shares recovered 259% to a high of 352 cents in May 2007 before again falling 78% to 77 cents in May of this year. Since then the shares have started to recover. The Relative Strength rating is -4.1%, ranked 62 (on a scale of 0-99), but improving rapidly.

#### **Summary and Recommendation**

We are recommending the purchase of Village Roadshow A Class Preference shares for both a very high income, plus profit recovery and growth and a re-rating in asset values.

Based upon last year's dividend the yield is 25.3%. The current year preference share dividend will likely be lower although with a *minimum* annual dividend of 10.175 cents to yield at least 13.2%.

This is also an asset rich situation, with Village Roadshow owning listed Austereo shares worth 113 cents for each of its own shares. So a \$1000 investment in Village Roadshow preference shares gives an indirect investment in \$1412 worth of Austereo shares.

Total asset backing per share is 280 cents, so the ordinary shares are trading at a 58% discount and the preference shares trade at a 72% discount to asset backing. At 77 cents the preference shares trade at a large 35% discount to the value of the ordinary shares.

Expansion of its Theme Park division into international markets offers good growth potential from a business with reliable high cashflows.

Village Roadshow preference shares should appeal to most investors as they offer a reliable current income, with good potential for profit growth and income growth and significant potential for the share price to recover in value and to appreciate further over the medium to long term.

**Village Roadshow (ord)**



**Austereo**





# Computer Selections of Australian Shares based upon our Comprehensive Share Selection Criteria

For an explanation of this table see the *Share Selection Methods* report available from our website. These shares are not formal "buy" and "sell" recommendations, but the "Under-Valued", "Best Performing" and "Income" shares should be considered for purchase, while the "Over-Valued" and "Worst Performing" shares can generally be sold to release money for re-investment in more attractive shares.

STRENGTH_RATING														STRENGTH_RATING																												
Buy-Sell														Buy-Sell																												
Company	Share	Cur-	4-Wk	Rank	Insider	Brokers	Price	Return	Vola-	Price	Divi-	Price	Market	Company	Share	Cur-	4-Wk	Rank	Insider	Brokers	Price	Return	Vola-	Price	Divi-	Price	Market															
	Price	rent	Chg.	0-99	Buy	Follow	to	on	til-	Earn.	dend	Sales	Cap'n		Price	rent	Chg.	0-99	Buy	Follow	to	on	til-	Earn.	dend	Sales	Market															
							NTA	Equity	ity	Ratio	Yield	Ratio									NTA	Equity	ity	Ratio	Yield	Ratio																
<b>OVER-VALUED SHARES: Highest Price/Sales Ratios, Relative Strength &lt; 0</b>														<b>INSIDER SELLING: Most Insider Selling, Relative Strength &lt; 0</b>																												
London City Eq.	40	-10.0	-3.6	74	0-0	-	0.7	5	0.5	13	7.5	9.76	9	Oilx Ltd	22	-29.2	+3.1	95	1-0	-	-	1.4	NE	Nil	N/A	28	Hitech Energy	3	-12.0	+1.8	78	0-7	-	-	1.4	300	Nil	N/A	13			
ICS Global Ltd	11	-5.0	-5.1	64	0-0	-	11.0	-	1.2	NE	Nil	9.12	19	Fermiscan Hold.	14	-28.5	-3.1	94	0-0	-	2.3	-	1.2	NE	Nil	5.36	20	Linc Energy Ltd	138	-12.1	-7.5	78	0-5	-	-	0.7	NE	Nil	N/A	443		
Polartechnics	7	-17.8	-6.9	85	0-0	-	7.1	-	1.6	NE	Nil	8.77	17	Mintails Ltd	4	-28.4	+0.9	94	5-0	-	0.2	-	2.1	NE	Nil	1.09	18	Sonic Health	1222	-2.4	+2.3	58	0-5	15	-	0.3	17	4.3	1.71	4,075		
Rubik Financial	8	-3.4	+3.5	61	0-0	-	0.8	-	1.0	NE	Nil	8.63	20	East'd Medical	3	-27.4	-0.2	93	0-0	-	0.4	-	1.6	NE	Nil	0.59	9	Bank of Q'land	1103	-0.0	+6.4	51	0-5	14	2.0	16	0.3	13	6.6	0.75	1,654	
Copper Range	2	-19.8	-7.1	87	0-0	-	-	-	2.6	NE	Nil	8.61	19	Austral Gold	9	-26.1	+4.2	93	0-0	-	-	-	1.2	NE	Nil	N/A	6	CVC Limited	60	-2.4	+1.1	58	0-3	-	0.5	1	0.5	90	10.0	3.33	103	
Monto Minerals	6	-4.9	+1.4	64	0-0	-	-	-	1.2	NE	Nil	8.57	19	TZ Limited	96	-26.0	-3.5	93	6-0	-	-	-	1.0	NE	Nil	2.34	37	Tatts Group Ltd	255	-4.2	-0.6	63	0-3	13	-	-	0.4	13	3.7	1.05	3,227	
Primeag Aust.	107	-8.2	-2.7	71	2-0	2	0.8	1	0.6	82	Nil	8.29	161	Indo Mines Ltd	19	-25.8	+1.4	93	0-0	-	-	-	0.7	NE	Nil	N/A	13	Analytica Ltd	2	-18.9	-2.1	86	0-3	-	-	-	1.7	NE	Nil	N/A	6	
Adavale Res.	3	-2.7	+4.4	59	4-0	-	1.1	-	2.2	NE	Nil	8.10	6	Adelphi Energy	6	-25.4	+5.2	92	0-0	-	-	-	1.7	NE	Nil	N/A	7	Eromanga H/C	15	-15.5	+2.3	82	0-3	-	-	-	0.9	NE	Nil	N/A	26	
Island Sky Aust.	25	-11.2	+2.1	76	0-2	-	-	-	0.8	125	Nil	7.86	31	Maximus Res	3	-25.4	+2.4	92	1-0	-	-	-	1.7	NE	Nil	4.49	8	Rock Build Soc.	270	-4.2	+2.4	62	0-3	1	1.8	16	0.2	12	7.6	0.53	52	
AMF Asset Yield	68	-0.1	-5.4	51	1-0	2	2.3	-	0.5	NE	Nil	7.84	106	Aviva Corp Ltd	14	-25.2	+2.9	92	0-0	-	-	-	0.9	NE	Nil	N/A	11	Hydromet Corp.	6	-10.2	+0.8	75	0-3	-	1.4	22	1.2	6	3.6	0.47	18	
WCP Resources	4	-2.8	+2.4	59	0-0	-	-	-	1.8	NE	Nil	7.80	6	Minerals Corp.	0	-25.2	+2.8	92	4-0	-	0.4	-	4.6	NE	Nil	0.83	10	Bendigo Bank	813	-11.4	+6.3	77	1-4	16	1.9	18	0.3	11	7.1	0.77	2,233	
Metal Storm Ltd	3	-14.8	-0.2	81	1-0	-	-	-	1.9	NE	Nil	7.78	17	Cytopia Ltd	8	-24.7	-1.3	92	0-0	-	1.0	-	1.1	NE	Nil	1.35	7	Guinness Peat	61	-11.5	+2.5	77	0-2	-	0.5	-	0.4	NE	3.4	0.30	858	
Aurora Sand Div	109	-2.9	+0.5	59	0-0	-	1.0	10	0.4	11	7.3	7.66	39	Mercury Mob.	5	-24.7	-2.5	92	0-0	-	-	-	1.4	NE	Nil	0.81	5	APN News Media	180	-10.5	+7.3	76	0-2	11	-	-	0.3	NE	12.5	0.74	1,059	
Aust Enh Income	590	-3.2	+1.5	60	0-0	-	1.1	-	0.3	NE	11.9	7.22	19	Mission New En.	17	-24.5	-0.7	91	0-0	-	0.2	4	0.9	7	Nil	0.67	16	Island Sky Aust	25	-11.2	+2.1	76	0-2	-	-	-	0.7	125	Nil	7.86	31	
CFS Retail Prop	171	-3.0	+3.4	60	0-0	10	0.8	14	0.5	6	7.0	7.20	3,867	Admiralty Res.	2	-24.5	+1.9	91	1-1	-	-	-	2.3	NE	Nil	N/A	16	ISS Group Ltd	24	-18.5	+1.3	85	0-2	-	2.6	42	0.7	6	7.4	1.27	23	
Contango Cap P.	38	-2.3	+0.1	57	0-1	-	0.6	-	0.7	NE	8.6	6.97	38	Ottoman Energy	6	-23.8	+3.0	91	1-0	-	-	-	1.2	NE	Nil	N/A	22	SP Ausnet	76	-11.1	-0.9	76	0-1	10	0.9	8	0.4	11	15.6	1.38	2,372	
Adv Share Reg.	25	-2.3	+7.1	57	1-0	-	2.7	18	1.0	15	6.1	6.79	10	Quest Petroleum	1	-22.8	+2.0	90	0-0	-	-	-	3.3	NE	Nil	N/A	18	Macmin Silver	4	-7.9	+2.0	70	0-1	-	-	-	1.3	NE	Nil	N/A	20	
AMF Asset Yield	137	-6.6	+0.4	68	0-0	-	0.7	6	0.5	11	12.6	6.66	136	Advanced Engine	4	-22.7	-0.1	90	1-0	-	-	-	1.7	NE	Nil	1.17	5	Moly Mines Ltd	96	-4.0	+11.6	62	0-1	1	-	-	0.3	NE	Nil	N/A	60	
Gateway Mining	9	-3.1	+3.9	60	1-0	-	-	-	1.0	143	Nil	6.62	9	Nupower Res.	4	-21.9	+6.2	89	1-0	-	-	-	1.6	NE	Nil	N/A	9	Contango Cap P.	38	-2.3	+0.1	57	0-1	-	0.6	-	0.7	NE	8.6	6.97	38	
MMC Contrarian	43	-1.1	+1.6	55	1-0	-	0.7	-	0.5	NE	Nil	6.60	105	Tamaya Res.	1	-21.8	+3.8	89	0-0	-	-	-	2.8	2	Nil	0.31	15	Reverse Corp	75	-17.7	+4.0	85	0-1	4	18.8	-	0.4	3	32.0	1.41	69	
Deutsche Ind Tr	196	+0.0	+0.0	50	0-0	-	1.2	10	0.2	12	8.1	6.49	663	Centaurus Res.	37	-21.5	+2.4	89	1-0	-	-	-	0.9	NE	Nil	N/A	8	Occupational Md	20	-6.9	+2.9	69	0-1	-	-	-	0.8	NE	Nil	4.88	8	
Aevum Ltd	123	-2.0	+5.9	57	0-0	3	0.6	11	0.4	5	7.3	6.17	153	Aneka Tambang	100	-20.9	+3.7	88	0-0	-	-	-	1.0	NE	12.0	N/A	1,908	Spark Infrastru	106	-5.1	+2.8	65	0-1	7	-	-	0.5	113	17.5	4.68	1,069	
Deutsche Div Tr	131	+0.0	+0.0	50	0-0	-	1.1	8	0.3	14	7.1	6.10	1,306	Heemskirk Cons.	36	-20.9	-3.7	88	0-0	2	0.5	-	0.6	NE	2.8	0.85	28	Wallace Abs Ret	7	-30.5	+3.6	95	0-0	-	0.2	-	1.0	NE	Nil	0.62	7	
Phylogica Ltd	5	-3.2	-6.8	60	0-0	-	5.0	-	1.5	NE	Nil	6.10	7	Optiscan Image	7	-20.6	+5.2	88	0-0	-	3.5	-	1.1	NE	Nil	2.86	8	Norwest Energy	2	-30.5	+4.4	95	1-0	-	-	-	2.5	NE	Nil	3.64	6	
Pac Environment	25	-9.5	-3.4	74	2-0	-	2.8	-	1.0	NE	Nil	6.00	20	Tyrian Diagnost	2	-20.6	+1.9	88	0-0	-	1.0	-	2.2	NE	Nil	1.92	9	Eden Energy Ltd	6	-29.2	+1.8	95	1-0	-	-	-	1.4	NE	Nil	N/A	8	
Van Eyk Blue AP	704	-2.5	+0.2	58	0-0	-	0.9	6	0.3	16	9.8	5.99	38	Herald Resource	42	-20.5	+2.6	88	1-0	-	-	-	0.8	NE	Nil	N/A	85															

# Writing Covered Call Options for Extra Income (or “Picking up Pennies in front of a Steamroller”)

There are a large number of investment “advisers” promoting schemes with which this newsletter does not agree. It is, however, not our job to comment on the follies of pouring money into the black holes of time-share investments, using the “lazy equity in your home” to finance inner-city apartment developments or high interest deposits with finance companies making dubious, high risk loans to “smart money” property developers! Slick sales people will always find a virtually unlimited source of unsophisticated investors with cash to spend on such schemes.

Over the last month, however, two stockmarket advisers have been promoting the writing of covered call options as an apparent low risk strategy for generating an additional “lucrative income stream” from share portfolios. If these recommendations were made only to their existing newsletter customers, then it wouldn't be our place to comment. In both cases, however, covered call option writing has been suggested in promotional emails sent out to many brokerage customers. The chances are that subscribers to *this* newsletter probably received one or both of these emails from their broker . . . so are covered call options the low risk way to earn some “lucrative” extra income?

## **Writing Covered Call Options**

This investment strategy involves owning a share and writing (i.e. selling) an *exchange traded* call option. If the share price either (1) remains steady or (2) falls in value, then the call option writer is better off by the amount of the income earned selling the call option which expires worthless. If the share price rises and the call option is exercised, then we are usually told the investor is no worse off but simply sells the shares to the call option purchaser.

To quote from one of the emails “It is clear that an investor using a covered call strategy is always in a better position than an investor who does not sell the call option except in the case where the share price appreciates significantly prior to the expiry of the option”. They also make the statement that “The covered call strategy can help the investor partially reduce the downside risk on their holdings” which makes absolutely no sense whatsoever to us!

The hypothetical example in the promotional email also shows an investor earning a 5% premium (per month!) for a call option with a high strike price 20% above the current share price (i.e. and therefore unlikely to be exercised). If one could earn that sort of option premium, then covered call option writing might be worth considering . . . but in practice much more risky call options with a strike price just 10% above the current share price might earn a significantly lower 0.5-1.0% premium!

As the promoter had to use a hypothetical example - and multiply the potential returns 10-fold - to make this strategy look attractive, investors should already be able to guess that potential income from writing covered call options isn't all that “lucrative”!

## **Risk and Returns**

So is covered call option writing the low risk strategy that it is widely promoted to be? Or a high risk strategy involving very small potential gains but with a low chance of catastrophic loss (i.e. like “picking up pennies in front of a steamroller”)?

By selling a call option, the investor removes his potential for a capital gain if the share price increases significantly - and receives instead a small income from the premium received selling the option. The investor still faces the potential for a capital loss if the share price falls. So an investor involved in the covered call option writing strategy retains all of the risks involved in share ownership but swaps the potentially unlimited gains (i.e. if the stockmarket recovers strongly or the company reports strong growth or the company receives a takeover offer) for a small income.

Given the small value received selling a call option, we do not believe this is an attractive risk/return situation.

## **Writing Naked Put Options**

While many people promote writing covered call options as a low risk strategy, everyone considers writing naked put options (i.e. selling a speculator the right to *sell* a share to you at a fixed price) a high risk strategy - when, in fact, both strategies have exactly the same risk/return characteristics.

If you have trouble understanding how selling a covered call option is the same as selling a naked put option, then you shouldn't be trading in options. (In fact, if you *do* understand it, you are also probably smart enough to know that you shouldn't be trading in options!) In both cases, you are selling the unlimited upside potential to a third party for a small premium, while retaining all of the downside risk.

## **Summary and Recommendation (and a useful Investment Trick)**

Here is an unfair trick to play on promoters of covered call option writing: Next time someone suggests you become involved in writing covered call options, tell them you have heard that writing naked put options is a better strategy! Both, of course, are identical in risk and return - and you can fall around laughing to yourself as they explain (and reveal their lack of knowledge) that writing covered calls is low risk while writing naked puts is very high risk!

Many hedge funds employ strategies that earn reliable income each month but involve a small (and previously ignored) risk of catastrophic loss. This has been compared





## Investment Outlook

(Continued from Page 1)

could move from their recent extreme of under-valuation to an extreme of over-valuation over the next 12-36 months. (This flow into equities will also help companies raise equity to replace bank debt and strengthen the corporate sector - which would justify a significant re-rating in share prices.)

Share valuations also remain low - even if profits *currently* being reported are temporarily depressed by the recent economic downturn. Even if economic activity is slow to recover, corporate profitability will improve as companies have downsized and reduced overheads, adapting to the less buoyant economic environment.

Our Stockmarket Forecasts are firmly Bullish (i.e. favourable).

In a stockmarket recovery, investors portfolios can appreciate 50-100% per annum over several years, multiplying one's wealth several fold! So for now - and probably for the next few years - investors should be fully invested in equities.

## Dividends

Company	Cents per Share	Ex-Date	Pay-able	Tax Credit
Abano Healthcare	12.00	12-08	19-08	5.2008
Cynotech Holdings	0.05	25-09	30-09	Nil
Kermadec Property	1.25	14-08	21-08	Nil
Smiths City Market	1.00	07-08	14-08	Nil
<u>Australian Shares</u>				
Challenger Wine Trust	1.20	24-06	17-08	

### Total Return Index for All Listed Shares

Jul 13	2736.89	Jul 20	2820.91
Jul 14	2748.50	Jul 21	2873.19
Jul 15	2764.08	Jul 22	2900.44
Jul 16	2801.52	Jul 23	2918.63
Jul 17	2808.22	Jul 24	2961.17
Jul 27	2998.01	Aug 3	3047.85
Jul 28	3018.47	Aug 4	3092.80
Jul 29	2990.47	Aug 5	3084.07
Jul 30	2994.00	Aug 6	3056.15
Jul 31	3016.20	Aug 7	3069.00

### Next Issue:

The next issue of *Market Analysis* will be emailed in five weeks time on Monday September 14, 2009.

The print version will be delivered later that week, depending upon printing and postal delivery times.

MARKET ANALYSIS is published 12 times per year by Securities Research Company Limited, P.O. Box 34-162, Birkenhead, Auckland. Subscribe online at [www.stockmarket.co.nz](http://www.stockmarket.co.nz) or [www.australia-stockmarket.com](http://www.australia-stockmarket.com) or email [james@stockmarket.co.nz](mailto:james@stockmarket.co.nz).

Readers are advised that they should not assume that every recommendation made in the future will be profitable or equal the performance of recommendations made in the past. A summary of all prior recommendations is published on the website. The information presented has been obtained from original and published sources believed to be reliable, but its accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

The entire contents are copyright. Reproduction in whole or part is strictly forbidden without the approval of the publisher.

[www.stockmarket.co.nz](http://www.stockmarket.co.nz)

This page is intentionally blank.