

Market Analysis

Issue No. 549

www.stockmarket.co.nz

March 12, 2018

Inside Market Analysis

Cynata Therapeutic shares rise on “excellent” clinical trial data 5, 6
 Silver Chef to focus on more profitable hospitality business. “Mr Market” sells, Insiders buy 10
 Company Review: Stellar Resources 11, 12, 13

Neglect Ratings of New Zealand Shares 15
 Neglect Rating of Australian Shares 16, 17
 Short Interest in Australian Shares 17, 18

Founder: James R Cornell (B.Com.)

Summary and Recommended Investment Strategy.

Remain fully invested in the recommended shares.

Investment Outlook.

Part of our *Investment Strategy* exploits the fact that share returns are “skewed to the right”. In simple terms that means that we can lose no more than 100% on any individual share investment, but that there is no limit to potential returns. Successful investments may (and have!) increased 5, 10, 20 or 50-fold (i.e. 400%, 900%, 1900% or 4900%) or more in value.

Those big winners drag up the portfolio average return. In mathematical terms, the “average” return will be higher than the “median” (i.e. the middle return).

To exploit this favourable investment mathematics it is important to have a well diversified portfolio - which increases the probability of owning those potential big winners.

This works both for our “active” portfolio management style and also for “passive” index investing.

Note that we “actively” seek to *select the right shares* to buy and hold but that we are patient, long term investors and do not “actively” trade our shares. Many “passive” index funds will have a higher portfolio turnover ratio than us (i.e. many so-called “passive” funds will buy and sell shares more often than our “active” portfolio).


The impact on index investing can be demonstrated by examining the returns of shares in the S&P 500 Index over the last 20 years. The “median” return was 141% (4.5% per annum compounded) - which is to say that 250 shares earned total returns *less* than 141% and 250 shares earned returns *greater* than 141%. Some very large returns - 49 shares returned over 1000% - helped drag up the average to 377% (8.1% per annum compounded). The average return of this diversified portfolio beats 70% of the individual stock returns.

If we actively select shares in which to invest then we will still get a similar distribution of returns: The “average” portfolio return will exceed about 70% of the individual returns. Therefore it is equally important for us to widely diversify our portfolios to get a reliable “average” return. Twenty shares is good, 40-50 is better!

Even when investors *perfectly* understand the impact of share returns being
 (Continued on Page 20)

Stockmarket Forecasts

	One-Month	One-Year
Australia:	66% (Bullish)	58% (Neutral)
New Zealand:	65% (Bullish)	61% (Bullish)



Recommended Investments

Cavalier Corporation has returned to profitability.

Six Months to 31/12/2017			
	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$75.3m	\$84.3m	+18.8%
Net Profit	\$1.1m	<\$1.9m>	-
Net Cash Surplus	\$7.5m	<\$4.8m>	-
Earnings per share	1.7c	Nil	-
Dividends per share	Nil	Nil	-

The lower wool price is “now starting to flow through material costs and improve manufacturing margins”. Raw material costs will be lower in the second half, with the full benefit of lower wool prices in the June 2019 financial year. The manufacturing consolidation is complete but further manufacturing efficiency and lower costs can be expected.

A reduction in yarn and carpet stock holdings boosted the net operating cash surplus and allowed interest bearing debts to be reduced \$7.4 million to \$34.1 million. Further debt reduction remains a focus for the future.

The company is experiencing “good demand” for its “high end, high margin *Cavalier Bremworth* woollen products and now sees “a clear path forward as a quality focused carpet manufacturer”, with “a return to sustainable and profitable growth”.

Cavalier Corporation



Colonial Motor Company's improved profitability was driven by sales volumes and trading profits on heavy trucks. Car sales were up, but less profitable than last year:

Six Months Year to 31/12/2017			
	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$461.7m	\$438.2m	+5.4%
Net Profit	\$11.9m	\$10.3m	+15.9%
Net Cash Surplus	<\$4.4m>	\$12.4m	-
Earnings per share	36.4c	31.4c	+15.9%
Dividends per share	15.0c	13.0c	+15.4%

The “new vehicle market continues to grow” and the company has “strong forward orders for heavy trucks” but growth is slowing and “business confidence is more cautious”.

Steel & Tube Holdings

Six Months to 31/12/2017			
	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$267.9m	\$255.9m	+5.3%
Net Profit	\$3.8m	\$10.6m	-64.4%
Net Cash Surplus	\$17.7m	\$14.0m	+26.4%
Earnings per share	4.2c	11.8c	-64.4%
Dividends per share	7.0c	9.0c	-22.2%

Profitability was partially depressed by writing down obsolete stock \$5.5 million and \$2.6 million of expenses for “organisational changes”.

The reduction in inventories boosted the net operating cash surplus while the sale (and leaseback) of a property for \$32.5 million helped reduce interest bearing debts by \$36.7 million to \$96.7 million.

Full year earnings (excluding the stock writedown and restructuring costs) are still expected to be “materially consistent” with the June 2017 result.

At 211 cents, Steel & Tube Holdings shares trade at a very low Price/Sales ratio of 0.37. Historically the P/S ratio has ranged between extremes of 0.32 and 1.17, so the shares trade near an extreme of undervaluation.

The gross Dividend Yield is 10.5% (although the annual dividend may be cut a little this year, lowering that yield). Historically the yield has ranged between extremes of 4.5% and 14.9%, so 10.5% indicates good value.

The Price/Earnings ratio is 10, compared with an historical range of 7-24. This again shows very good value.

Over the last year there have been four *insider* buys (and no sells). Insiders - the most *knowledgeable* investors - also see good value in Steel & Tube Holdings shares.

“Buy” for a high current income and long term capital appreciation.

Steel & Tube Holdings



Australian Shares

(This section is in Australian currency, unless stated.)

AcruX Ltd's revenues and profits fell (to a *loss*) owing to the discontinuation of *Axiron* sales.

Six Months to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$2.7m	\$14.3m	-80.9%
Net Profit	<\$3.0m>	\$6.3m	-
Net Cash Surplus	<\$1.4m>	\$2.6m	-
Earnings per share	Nil	3.8c	-100.0%
Dividends per share	Nil	Nil	-

Six Months to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$57.3m	\$51.4m	+11.6%
Net Profit	<\$6.2m>	<\$25.2m>	-
Net Cash Surplus	<\$1.9m>	<\$7.2m>	-
Earnings per share	Nil	Nil	-
Dividends per share	Nil	Nil	-

In addition there was a non-cash writedown of \$5.65 million in *Axiron* capitalised development costs.

Cash on hand is down just 4.7% at \$32.4 million (13.9 cents per share).

AJ Lucas Group plans to sell its *Engineering Construction* division which is treated as a “discontinued business” in the recent half year report:

The company received a number of proposals for the *Engineering & Construction* division but is currently considering “selling the plant and equipment” (worth about \$3.4 million) and a “profit sharing arrangement on two existing major contracts”. This will also realise cash from “existing cash funded project bonds”.

Revenues from continuing businesses were up 65.6%, but the company was (Continued on Page 4)

Portfolio of Recommended Investments

CURRENT ADVICE	Company	Code	Initial Recommendation - Date - Price	Performance Forecast	Issued Shares (mil.)	Vola- tility Ratio	Price/ Sales Ratio	Price/ Earnings Ratio	Gross Dividend Yield	Recent Share Price	Cash Dividends Rec'd	Total Return %
<u>NZ Shares</u>												
BUY	CDL Investments Ltd	CDI	12/01/99 25	C	277.5	1.1	3.25	8	5.3	92	32.8	+399%
HOLD+	Cavalier Corporation	CAV	05/12/95 156*	B	68.7	1.6	0.25	NE	Nil	57	282.0	+117%
HOLD	Colonial Motor Company	CMO	10/11/92 128*	A	32.7	0.5	0.29	11	8.2	748	544.3	+910%
HOLD	Smiths City Group	SCY	09/10/06 64	E	52.7	1.4	0.13	14	9.0	54	37.0	+42%
HOLD	South Port New Zealand	SPN	13/02/96 120	C	26.2	0.4	4.38	19	5.9	615	277.3	+644%
BUY	Steel & Tube Holdings	STU	08/08/00 146	E	90.6	0.9	0.37	10	10.5	211	363.6	+294%
<u>Australian Shares (in Aust cents)</u>												
HOLD+	Acrux Limited	ACR	12/05/14 99	A	166.5	2.4	1.08	4	Nil	16	14.0	-70%
HOLD+	AJ Lucas Group	AJL	13/05/03 107*	C	737.0	1.7	1.79	NE	Nil	37	36.4	-32%
HOLD	ALS Limited	ALQ	12/10/99 72*	B	490.4	0.5	2.90	33	1.8	733	303.9	+1340%
HOLD	AtCor Medical Ltd	ACG	11/11/13 15	D	233.6	6.5	1.51	NE	Nil	3	Nil	-81%
HOLD+	Atlas Pearls & Perfume	ATP	14/05/96 73	C	422.9	6.4	0.73	13	Nil	3	17.5	-72%
HOLD+	Brickworks Ltd	BKW	12/11/12 1115	A	149.4	0.3	2.78	12	3.3	1568	209.5	+59%
HOLD-	Cardno Ltd	CDD	14/12/09 223*	B	479.6	0.9	0.56	33	Nil	140	98.0	+7%
HOLD	Clarius Group Ltd	CND	08/04/03 82*	C	89.6	3.4	0.05	NE	Nil	9	70.5	-4%
HOLD	CPT Global Ltd	CGO	10/03/08 88	C	37.3	2.4	0.22	NE	Nil	16	19.0	-60%
HOLD	CSG Limited	CSV	11/10/10 175	B	322.4	1.8	0.41	9	Nil	31	64.0	-46%
HOLD+	Cynata Thera.	CYP	13/03/17 50	C	90.1	1.0	NA	NE	Nil	119	Nil	+138%
HOLD+	Ellex Medical Lasers	ELX	14/03/06 49	D	121.1	1.4	1.41	NE	Nil	84	Nil	+70%
BUY	Fastbrick Robotics	FBR	07/07/17 14	D	1052.3	2.6	NA	NE	Nil	16	Nil	+11%
HOLD	Fiducian Group	FID	11/02/08 260	B	31.3	0.5	3.94	21	3.1	509	85.8	+129%
BUY	Finbar Group Ltd	FRI	12/04/10 106	B	231.4	0.9	1.76	20	6.4	94	68.5	+53%
HOLD+	Iluka Resources Ltd	ILU	12/10/04 471	B	418.7	0.5	4.13	47	2.9	1063	247.0	+178%
HOLD	Integrated Research	IRI	14/01/08 40	B	171.7	0.4	7.45	38	1.6	398	52.5	+1026%
HOLD	McMillan Shakespeare G	MMS	07/11/16 1041	A	83.2	0.4	2.85	17	3.8	1757	66.0	+75%
HOLD-	Melbourne IT	MLB	10/02/04 53	A	117.4	0.6	1.96	28	3.3	330	210.5	+920%
HOLD	Michael Hill Int'l Ltd	MHJ	11/06/91 4*	B	387.4	1.0	0.76	16	4.4	114	64.8	+4371%
HOLD+	Mt Gibson Iron	MGX	10/11/14 44	B	1096.6	2.1	2.39	16	5.3	38	2.0	-9%
HOLD	Novarise Renewable Res	NOE	14/03/11 25	E	415.1	2.3	0.42	NE	Nil	16	Nil	-36%
HOLD	Onterran Ltd	OTR	16/08/10 103*	D	57.5	1.8	0.07	NE	Nil	32	Nil	-69%
HOLD+	Opthea Limited	OPT	10/02/04 188	C	200.6	1.8	NA	NE	Nil	60	65.0	-34%
BUY	OZ Minerals	OZL	14/03/16 522	A	298.7	0.4	2.72	12	2.1	933	40.0	+86%
HOLD+	Prophecy International	PRO	08/09/08 26	C	64.0	1.4	3.55	NE	Nil	51	24.0	+188%
HOLD	Reckon Limited	RKN	08/08/16 141	A	113.3	0.7	3.30	73	2.1	143	8.0	+21%
BUY	Silver Chef Ltd	SIV	13/11/17 740	B	39.0	0.5	0.56	8	9.2	412	Nil	-44%
HOLD	Technology One Ltd	TNE	11/11/03 44	B	315.5	0.5	6.00	37	1.6	520	80.1	+1264%
HOLD	The Reject Shop Ltd	TRS	11/01/05 257	A	28.9	0.5	0.27	17	3.2	745	486.5	+379%
HOLD+	Village Roadshow	VRL	10/08/09 77	B	161.9	0.6	0.52	23	Nil	336	308.0	+736%

The average Total Return (i.e. both Capital Gains/Losses plus Dividends received) of all current investments from initial recommendation is +336.6%. This is equal to an average annual rate of +31.1%, based upon the length of time each position has been held.

The average annual rate of gain of ALL recommendations (both the 37 current and 166 closed out) is +31.7%, compared with a market gain of +3.8% (by the SRC Total Return Index).

CURRENT ADVICE is either Buy, Hold+, Hold, Hold- or Sell. Hold+ indicates the most attractive shares not rated as Buy. Hold- indicates relatively less attractive issues.

* Initial Recommendation Prices adjusted for Share Splits, Bonus and Cash Issues.

(1) Reckon Ltd's return includes 1/3 share of GetBusy (GETB) worth 34.5 cents (60.9 Aust cents)

Recommended Investments*(Continued from Page 3)*

still unprofitable, mainly owing to high interest costs of \$10.1 million. Interest bearing loans to 31 December 2017 were \$112.2 million although the company has since raised \$52.6 million in its recent cash issue.

In the recent 1 for 6 cash issue, shareholders were able to apply for additional shares up to 100% of their basic entitlement, from shares not taken up by other shareholders. Shareholders that did apply received additional shares equal to about 48.7% of their basic entitlement.

AtCor Medical slightly lifted revenues and significantly cut its cash operating *deficit* . . . but is still losing money and short on cash (with \$724,671 at 31 December 2017):

Six Months Year to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$2.0m	\$1.8m	+7.0%
Net Profit	<\$0.982m>	<\$2.442m>	-
Net Cash Surplus	<\$1.0m>	<\$2.0m>	-52.0%
Earnings per share	Nil	Nil	
Dividends per share	Nil	Nil	

The smaller loss and reduced cash deficit reflects a 33.2% drop in operating expenses to \$2.83 million for the period. The significant point, however, is whether the business can lift revenues or reduce expenses to become *cashflow positive*. A continuing cash operating deficit will require further injections of new capital to keep the business alive. The directors “continue to monitor the liquidity of the group”, presumably ahead of the need to “raise capital to support new revenue and business opportunities”.

Unfortunately the company has historically *destroyed* Shareholder wealth through share placements at huge discounts to market prices!

On the positive side, the company “believes our traditional business will continue to provide consistent returns” (although gross margins are not sufficient to cover marketing cost or overheads) and are “looking to aggressively expand revenues” from “products, services and markets that represent significant new health market opportunities for AtCor”. They also promise that “over the next few months” they “will be releasing more details of our new market positioning in both our existing market as well as details on new opportunities that will underwrite the growth and profitability of the company going forward”.

Given that no details have been released to date we eagerly await these “more details”!

Atlas Pearls has harvested and sold pearls of a lower average size, resulting in the drop in revenues. 9-13 mm pearls appreciated in value, but the company has harvested more under 9 mm pearls “which are traditionally undervalued by pearl traders”. Many of these smaller pearls have been directed to the company's own jewellery manufacturing but this takes longer to reach market and produce revenues.

Six Months to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$6.3m	\$7.4m	-13.7%
Net Profit	<\$1.5m>	\$0.4m	-
Net Cash Surplus	<\$0.3m>	<\$1.3m>	
Earnings per share	Nil	0.1c	
Dividends per share	Nil	Nil	

The *loss* for the period was also increased by a \$950,000 downwards adjustment in the “fair value” of the company's oyster stock to \$17.2 million.

In recent harvests “colour, skin, lustre and shape have all steadily improved but value has been held back by average size shortfalls”. This smaller size is likely to be the result of an environmental factor, probably a “recorded temporary spike in ocean temperature” affecting food availability and causing the oysters to “shut down and focus on survival as opposed to building nacre for a period of time”. Pearls harvested in December show “improvements in shape and quality” and “also encouraging signs of a recovery in size”.

The increased number of shells seeded in 2016/17 will result in increased harvests in 2018/19, lifting revenues to achieve “a more sustainable business model”.

The number of pearls on hand (and available for sale) increased from 26,722 to 75,216 over the six months, with the realisable value of this stock increasing from \$490,000 to \$2.2 million (with a book value of \$1.8 million).

Atlas Pearls has also introduced a “more collaborative approach” to pearl trading and will alternate between private auctions and private sales events. Long standing clients who advance funds to Atlas Pearls will be given the option to inspect and bid for pearls at the private sales events.

Three long clients each advanced over \$1 million to the company in October for the right to inspect and bid on the December/January harvest ahead of auction. Each client purchased “more than the value of their pre-payment at a price consistent with average auction prices”. These private sales provide “more flexibility for both parties” and enable buyers to “top up or complete inventory” between auctions.

One customer has provided a Yen 100 million (A\$1,060,000) loan to Atlas Pearls at 2.5% interest to be repaid in June 2018 (or extended by 12 months, with the agreement of both parties).

Cardno Ltd has returned to profitability (after deducting a non-cash \$32.9 million decline in future tax benefits owing to the drop in the US corporate tax rate):

Six Months to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$543.4m	\$575.7m	-5.6%
Net Profit	\$11.0m	\$<21.1m>	-
Net Cash Surplus	\$31.6m	<\$9.9m>	-
Earnings per share	2.3c	Nil	-
Dividends per share	Nil	Nil	-

The full year's earnings (before interest, tax and depreciation) is forecast to be 25-35% higher at \$55-60 million. That could lift net profits 35-55% to around

\$27-31 million (5.7-6.5 cents per share), but with the shares trading at 140 cents that is still a high Price/Earnings ratio of 22-25.

Cardno Ltd



Clarius Group

Six Months to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$74.1m	\$80.7m	-8.2%
Net Profit	<\$1.9m>	<\$1.359m>	-
Net Cash Surplus	<\$1.1m>	<\$0.869m>	-
Earnings per share	Nil	Nil	-
Dividends per share	Nil	Nil	-

Clarius Group reports that “with our significant technological transformation projects now complete, our focus will be on continuing to improve operational efficiencies”. Those projects include an “industry-leading” Applicant Tracking System and a new payroll and customer billing system.

The company has “a range of immediate growth opportunities” and is “well placed to benefit in the second half”.

CPT Global recorded a pre-tax profit of \$265,000 but an unfavourable tax ruling on intercompany loans resulted in an after tax profit of just \$968.

Six Months to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$15.0m	\$14.3m	+4.7%
Net Profit	\$0.001	<\$0.316m>	-
Net Cash Surplus	<\$0.548m>	<\$0.667m>	-
Earnings per share	Nil	Nil	-
Dividends per share	Nil	Nil	-

North American revenues are expected to grow in the second half as two risk/return contracts progress and with two large “time and material” contracts expected to start at the end of the March 2018 quarter. It is also seeking to close other new contracts of large size with good margins.

The “investment in partners and new digital” services is “delivering incremental revenue” and opportunities with new clients. This revenue is “not yet significant” but a “growth driver for the business” with the immediate aim that digital services become “self-funding by the end of the financial year”.

CSG Limited

Six Months to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$117.2m	\$120.7m	-2.9%
Net Profit	<\$3.0m>	\$4.2m	-
Net Cash Surplus	<\$2.8m>	\$1.2m	-
Earnings per share	Nil	1.3c	-
Dividends per share	Nil	Nil	-

The net operating cash *deficit* (and surplus last year) have been adjusted for the net movement in Finance Lease receivables (i.e. a *decrease* of \$5,891,000 this year and a *decrease* of \$1,091,000 last year).

Cynata Therapeutics' share price has appreciated strongly following further “excellent” data on its steroid resistant GvHD clinical trial!

The *Primary Evaluation Period* (i.e. results to Day 100) “represents an improvement above the initial results announced in January”. As previously announced, all eight patients showed at least some improvement in GvHD (although one died of pneumonia, which is common with GvHD and not considered treatment related) but 50% of patients were completely free of GvHD signs and symptoms by Day 100 after treatment.

This is, of course, a small sample size (i.e. a total of just eight patients), but with no current approved treatment for steroid resistant GvHD the one-year mortality rate is usually around 70-90%!

The first eight patients were given a dose “anticipated to be at the lower end of the effective dose range” (i.e. one million cells per kilogram of body weight) in each of two infusions (not one, as we reported earlier) on Day 0 and Day 7. The next eight patients are being given double that dose (i.e. two million cells per kilogram).

This clinical study is already proving the safety of Cynata Therapeutics MSCs (i.e. “no treatment related serious adverse events or safety concerns were identified”) but this excellent result also appears to support the efficacy as a treatment for patients with steroid resistant GvHD (or as an alternative treatment to the use of steroids). That in turn increases the likelihood that Fujifilm Holdings will exercise its option to acquire the worldwide licence for this treatment.

Exercising that option (within 90 days of completing the trial) will generate an initial payment to Cynata Therapeutics of US\$3.0 million, Fujifilm Holdings will finance all further development costs and make milestone payments up to A\$60 million (including the initial payment) and pay “double digit” royalties on product sales (which would be an ever greater sum).

Fujifilm Holdings will also need to negotiate and pay additional upfront and ongoing fees for a licence to use the Cymerus manufacturing technology.

Or Fujifilm Holdings or some other regenerative medicine company may seek to takeover Cynata Therapeutics as the current clinical study proves the safety and efficacy of its manufacturing technology and “no other company in the world has the capability to produce MSCs at an equivalent commercial scale without requiring multiple donors” (which is both significantly more expensive and
(Continued on Page 6)

Recommended Investments

(Continued from Page 5)

produces MSCs of varying quality).

Cynata Therapeutics, of course, has no meaningful revenues at this stage. In the half year to 31 December 2017 it generated revenues of just \$77,140 and a *loss* of \$1.8 million and a net operating *deficit* of \$1.5 million. The company, however, has cash in the bank of \$8.8 million so is fully funded well past the end of the current clinical trial.

At 119 cents, Cynata Therapeutics is valued at \$107 million but its unique manufacturing technology should be essential to all companies seeking to commercialise and mass produce any stem cell therapy. That suggests the technology should be worth significantly more. “Hold+” for further gains.

Cynata Therapeutics



Ellex Medical Lasers' lower profits (and operating net cash *deficit*) reflect investment in product development and marketing.

Six Months Year to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$38.2m	\$34.3m	+11.6%
Net Profit	<\$2.4m>	\$1.0m	-
Net Cash Surplus	<\$0.5m>	<\$0.4m>	-
Earnings per share	Nil	0.8c	-
Dividends per share	Nil	Nil	-

Ellex Medical Lasers holds \$25.2 million (17.5 cents per share) in cash (and \$15.4 million in interest bearing debts) to continue to finance development of its *iTrack* business, while sacrificing short term profitability for long term growth.

Ellex Medical Lasers has recently “showcased its glaucoma products at the *American Glaucoma Society's* 2018 Annual Meeting in New York City” on 1-3 March which was attended by 1100 physicians. The company believes New York will be a “key growth region within the US market”.

Continued strong *iTrack* growth could add \$2 million of high margin revenues over the next year, an additional \$3 million the year after and a further \$4 million the following year. That would rapidly grow revenues and gross margins.

It is, of course, very difficult to value a high growth but as yet unprofitable business. Conservative estimates of revenue growth, potential margins and overheads could show a business may never be profitable or require

an initial upfront investment that exceeds the net present value of future earnings. In that case, a company's share could be worthless (or, at the very least, a poor long term investment).

Improve those future revenue forecasts by a few percentage points per year and a company could achieve its break-even level after which its profits could grow rapidly. The net present value of these potential future earnings could go from less than zero to infinity!

So the “fair value” of growth company shares *could be zero or a very large value*. The difference between those valuations can be a *very small* difference in future expectations. That is why growth company shares can (quite logically) be very volatile.

So what are Ellex Medical Lasers shares worth? Probably somewhere between 40 cents and 200 cents at present - depending what assumptions one wants to make about the future success of its businesses.

If *iTrack* is unsuccessful and never becomes profitable (which is unlikely) *and* the clinical study into the *2RT* laser treatment of Macular Degeneration proves unsuccessful, then the core, low growth laser business is probably worth about a Price/Sales ratio of 1.0. That would give a share value of about 85 cents, but the market could value the shares at half that as they have been spending money on unsuccessful growth projects.

On the other hand, if *iTrack's* high margin revenues continue to grow at 40-50% per annum (from a relatively low base at present) then this will rapidly grow the company's gross margins . . . which will rapidly grow to far exceed the relatively modest few million dollars per year being spent on product development, marketing and training. Positive final results from the Macular Degenerative clinical study (to be released in May) could trigger significant growth in *2RT* laser equipment sales *and* recurring fees from the growing number of procedures performed.

Taking current *iTrack* annual revenues of about \$10 million (i.e. \$5.2 million over the last half year) and assuming a (1) future net profit margin (i.e. once the business is past the initial development stage) and (2) a fair Price/Earnings ratio for this business we can make a rough estimate of the *current value* of this division. Let's estimate a 20% net profit margin (which is high, but not unreasonable for this type of business) and a fair Price/Earnings ratio around 20-40 (based upon expected high long term growth). Those assumptions would imply a current value for the *iTrack* division of \$40-80 million or 30-55 cents per share.

Add that to the 85 cents per share for the core laser business and we have a share valuation of 115-140 cents.

If *iTrack* revenues *double* over the next two years the net present value of this division will also rise 100% to 60-110 cents per share, taking the share valuation to 145-195 cents. The company sold 10,000 *iTrack* units in the year to June 2017, has already doubled production capacity to 20,000 units with plans to raise this to over 100,000 units annually. When sales reach 100,000 units annually this division could be worth \$400-800 million (300-550 cents per share)!

The *2RT* business opportunity is just too huge to calculate! 120 million people suffer from Age Related

Macular Degeneration, with US\$5 billion annually spent on drugs to fight off blindness in the later stages. The 2RT treatment is designed to fight early stages of the disease (for which there is currently no treatment) and rejuvenate the eye to avoid (or delay) the later stages. Ellex Medical Lasers has spent a few hundred thousand dollars per year over a long period to develop this technology and run clinical trials. This is a relatively modest total investment (that has been expensed) of perhaps a few million dollars, but if successful it will save the sight of millions of people per year and the net present value of this new business opportunity (i.e. equipment sales and on-going procedure fees) could be many hundreds of millions of dollars (i.e. many dollars per share!) . . . subject to a positive outcome of the clinical trial.

Ellex Medical Lasers shares peaked at 149 cents in December 2016 and have since lost 48% of their value falling to a recent low of 77 cents. Since late 2016 we have suggested investors over-weighted in Ellex Medical Laser shares realise some partial profits. The shares had risen very strong and can be volatile.

At current prices - or on any further weakness - we would look to again start buying shares and adding to our holding in this company. For now we will upgrade this to a "Hold+".

Ellex Medical Lasers



Fastbrick Robotics has no revenues (other than some interest income and small grants) and reported a *loss* of \$3,016,131 for the half year to 31 December 2017. There was a net cash operating *deficit* of \$1.3 million plus another \$4.8 million spent on the *Hadrian X* development.

Cash in the bank is \$40.0 million (2.6 cents per share) - boosted by the recent share placement at 19 cents per share to raise \$37.6 million. "Buy".

Fastbrick Robotics



Fiducian Group produced further steady growth in revenues, profits and dividends:

Six Months to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$22.3m	\$19.9m	+12.3%
Net Profit	\$4.3m	\$3.4m	+26.3%
Net Cash Surplus	\$4.8m	\$3.6m	+32.2%
Earnings per share	13.9c	11.0c	+26.4%
Dividends per share	9.0c	7.1c	+26.8%

Fiducian Group



Finbar Group reported a *loss* of \$291,943 after a \$2,427,336 write-down in the value of its investment properties (a \$3.0 million writedown in 2016):

Six Months to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$44.0m	\$19.6m	+125.2%
Net Profit	<\$0.3m>	<-\$2.9m>	-
Earnings per share	Nil	Nil	-
Dividends per share	3.0c	3.0c	-

The higher revenues simply reflect the timing and settlement of major projects.

The company has \$118.8 million of interest bearing debt, but this is all project specific, non-recourse loans. There is no corporate debt. Cash in the bank is \$35.2 million (15.2 cents per share).

New sales (i.e. off the plan pre-sales and sales of completed stock) over the half year were \$118.1 million, up 41.1% on the first half of the previous year. This was up a further \$34.7 million to \$152.8 million by the middle of February! This is the leading indicator for the business. Finbar Group will only proceed with developments when it has reached an acceptable level of pre-sales. So a low level of new sales would see the release of new projects pushed back, while an increase in these new sales contracts will accelerate the rate of development of projects to meet demand. "Buy".

Finbar Group



(Continued on Page 8)

Recommended Investments

(Continued from Page 7)

Iuka Resources' results show a strong recovery (after excluding the \$106 million after tax asset impairment of the *Hamilton* mineral separation plant, the \$30 million write-down in the value of its **Metalysis** shareholding and a \$125 million increase in US land rehabilitation provisions):

	Year to 31/12/2017		
	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$1077.8m	\$774.4m	+39.2%
Net Profit	\$89.0m	<\$83.3m>	-
Net Cash Surplus	\$413.7m	\$137.3m	+201.3%
Earnings per share	21.3c	Nil	-
Dividends per share	31.0c	3.0c	+933.3%

The Zircon price rose 40% during 2017. Rutile prices were up 13%. Sales volumes rose 27% (although 16% of this was from the acquisition of **Sierra Rutile**).

Strong operating cashflows helped reduce interest bearing debts by \$371.5 million to just \$236.1 million.

Capital expenditure will increase 4-5 fold over the current financial year to a forecast \$410 million (for *Cataby* \$250-275 million, Sierra Rutile dry mine expansion and other smaller projects)

Integrated Research

	Six Months to 31/12/2017		
	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$45.7m	\$43.3m	+5.4%
Net Profit	\$9.3m	\$7.7m	+19.9%
Net Cash Surplus	\$2.1m	\$6.8m	-69.8%
Earnings per share	5.4c	4.5c	+19.9%
Dividends per share	3.0c	3.0c	-

The cash operating surplus we calculate by deducting capitalised product development costs. Development spending rose 27% over the period. Despite the lower cash operating surplus (which has been volatile over recent years) the company is in a sound financial position. There is \$9.6 million (5.6 cents per share) of cash in the bank, no interest bearing debts and 87% of revenues are "recurring".

The **Cisco FedRAMP** project (which should generate additional recurring revenues for Integrated Research) appears to be far behind schedule and "will not benefit the current financial year".

McMillan Shakespeare

	Six Months to 31/12/2017		
	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$262.3m	\$251.3m	+4.4%
Net Profit	\$43.5m	\$40.4m	+7.5%
Net Cash Surplus	\$16.6m	\$10.3m	+61.9%
Earnings per share	52.6c	48.6c	+8.8%
Dividends per share	33.0c	31.0c	+6.5%

The *trading* profit above *excludes* asset impairments of \$15.0 million and a \$6.5 million "gain" on a likely decrease in deferred consideration (on a acquisition

which has "achieved strong growth", but not sufficient to trigger a previously larger expected future payment).

The "net cash surplus" shown above is not a good measure for this type of business as Accounting standards deduct any additional investment in financing and fleet assets (or add in any *decrease* in these assets) in calculating this surplus. *Growth* in the business will therefore show a low (or negative) cash operating surplus, while a *decline* in the business would show a huge operating cash surplus!

The company calculates "free cash flow" before financing and fleet investments which is a better measure of the company's operating cash generation. This free cash flow rose 4.7% to \$35.8 million.

The *Group Remuneration Services* division generates 75% of this free cash flow and 65% of net profits. *Asset Management* (i.e. vehicle leasing) generates around 15% of free cash flow and 25% of profits. *Retail Financial Services* accounts for about 10% of free cash flow and net profits.

90% of the group's \$347.9 million of interest bearing debts are in the *Asset Management* division to finance 62% of its investment in the leased vehicle fleet.

The *GRS* division holds a float of around \$390 million in cash (i.e. in trust accounts and off-balance sheet) but currently earns about 2.5% interest on this money. A 0.25% increase in interest rates would add \$975,000 to revenues and pre-tax profits.

Melbourne IT recorded a rise in revenues and net profits over the year to December 2017, although earnings per share growth was lower owing to the issue of new capital in a cash issue:

	Year to 31/12/2017		
	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$197.8m	\$168.4m	+17.4%
Net Profit	\$14.0m	\$10.7m	+30.1%
Net Cash Surplus	\$13.4m	\$14.3m	-6.0%
Earnings per share	11.9c	10.6c	+11.8%
Dividends per share	11.0c	8.0c	+37.5%

Melbourne IT forecasts earnings (before interest, tax and depreciation) to grow 13% to \$41.5-45.5 million and net profits about 8½% over the 2018 year.

Michael Hill International lifted revenues, but *trading* profits were slightly lower:

	Six Months Year to 31/12/2017		
	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$342.2m	\$327.5m	+4.5%
Net Profit	\$23.9m	\$25.8m	-7.0%
Net Cash Surplus	\$42.3m	\$15.9m	+165.7%
Earnings per share	2.2c	6.7c	-66.2%
Dividends per share	2.5c	2.5c	-

In addition the company wrote-down asset values in the *Emma & Roe* and the United States divisions by \$11.5 million and provided \$8.5 million for leases which it plans to exit.

The improvement in the net operating cash surplus reflects a return to more normal operations, with last

year's surplus depressed owing to the payment of a NZ\$2.5 million settlement with NZ Inland Revenue.

Canadian revenues and earnings were both up 17.6%, resulting in a steady earnings margin of 14.1%. In previous years this margin has risen with higher revenues - suggesting some economies of scale in the business. The Canadian margin is, however, lower than in Australia (17.6%, down from 18.5% last year) or New Zealand (22.6%, down from 24.7%) suggesting that further improvement in margins should be possible in the years ahead.

Subsequent to releasing its half year report, the company has decided to retain six *Emma & Roe* stores, "focused in a single market", with the remaining 24 to be closed by 30 June 2018. Lease terminations and employee severance costs are estimated at \$5.8-7.9 million.

Mt Gibson Iron

Six Months to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$96.4m	\$99.8m	-3.4%
Net Profit	\$16.0m	\$22.9m	-24.8%
Net Cash Surplus	\$14.5m	\$7.0m	+107.3%
Earnings per share	1.5c	2.1c	-24.8%
Dividends per share	Nil	Nil	-

In addition the company received \$64.3 million in insurance receipts.

Onterran Limited seeks to extend suspension of its shares until it has finalised "terms of a proposed recapitalisation" and completion of its outstanding financial accounts. The company is considering "a number of possible alternatives" for the recapitalisation while "complexities" relating to winding up **Bloomer Construction** and **McGrath** have delayed the audit and release of the company accounts.

The **Couran Cove Island Resort** increased "all key revenue items", with "an improved outlook for 2018".

Opthea Limited (which has little revenue other than some interest income) reported a *loss* of \$11,431,936 (*minus* 5.7 cents per share) for the half year to 31 December 2017. There was a net operating cash *deficit* of \$10,216,499.

Cash in the bank was \$41.9 million (20.8 cents per share).

OZ Minerals

Year to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$1023.1m	\$822.9m	+24.3%
Net Profit	\$231.1m	\$107.8m	+114.4%
Net Cash Surplus	\$342.9m	\$324.1m	+5.9%
Earnings per share	77.4c	35.7c	+116.8%
Dividends per share	20.0c	20.0c	-

Cash in the bank rose 11.2% to \$729.4 million (244 cents per share). Ore inventories increased 26.1% to \$676 million (226 cents per share).

Prophecy International reported steady total revenues and a small profit for the half year:

Six Months to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$5.9m	\$5.9m	-1.0%
Net Profit	\$0.090m	\$0.128m	-29.7%
Net Cash Surplus	<\$0.403m>	\$1.246m	-
Earnings per share	0.1c	0.2c	-29.7%
Dividends per share	Nil	Nil	-

The company, however, sold two legacy businesses towards the end of the June 2017 year. Adjusted for those sales, revenues from the remaining businesses were up 24.3%.

Cash on hand was \$2.3 million (3.6 cents per share).

SNARE revenues rose 6% to \$3.5 million while *eMite* revenues were 95% higher at \$1.8 million.

Prophecy International



Reckon Limited's large drop in revenues and profits largely represents the demerger and spin-off of the *Document Management Group* (as **GetBusy**) and the contract to sell the *Accountant Practice Management* division for \$180 million (160 cents per share) in cash:

Year to 31/12/2017

	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$48.9m	\$97.8m	-50.0%
Net Profit	\$2.2m	\$11.0m	-79.9%
Net Cash Surplus	\$9.7m	\$6.8m	+41.9%
Earnings per share	2.0c	9.8c	-79.9%
Dividends per share	3.0c	5.0c	-40.0%

Revenues from *continuing businesses* were down 1.5% to \$48.9 million, with net profits down 50.4% to \$2,211,000. Current profitability is depressed by development costs of \$8.3 million.

Net assets of \$38.5 million (i.e. assets of \$43.9 million and liabilities of \$5.4 million) in the *Accountant Practice Management* division will be sold for \$180 million cash (i.e. a \$141.5 million gain over book value), subject to approval by the ACCC and NZCC.

This cash will be used to repay some of the company's existing interest bearing debts of \$50.6 million, leaving about \$131.4 million (116 cents per share) in net cash. The company will then pay a partially franked dividend (which may be an unfavourable tax situation for NZ resident shareholders). Details will be released later, with settlement of the sales transaction expected in the June 2017 quarter. *(Continued on Page 10)*

Recommended Investments

(Continued from Page 9)

The existing business (although not very profitable owing to the high development expenditure) plus net cash per share of 116 cents *should* be worth more than the current share price of 138 cents - although at this stage there is uncertainty over the level of the planned dividend and franking credits.

Silver Chef plans to discontinue its *GoGetta* division and a non-cash impairment provision has resulted in the *loss* for the half year:

Six Months to 31/12/2017			
	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$146.0m	\$137.8m	+6.0%
Net Profit	<\$13.1m>	\$5.1m	-
Net Cash Surplus	\$75.1m	\$72.8m	+3.3%
Earnings per share	Nil	12.9c	-
Dividends per share	10.0c	12.9c	-22.5%

Despite the non-cash \$19.5 million impairment the company is “confident of realising the full pre-provision book value of the *GoGetta* business through the exit process”. The company has stopped making new loans and will “manage the orderly run-off of *GoGetta* business over the next 12 to 18 months” through the collection of the normal monthly payments on these contracts. This cashflow will “accelerate” the repayment of *GoGetta* interest bearing debts (subject to negotiations with its banks) over the next 12 months and then release the capital invested in this division for re-investment in the Hospitality business. “A significant level of cash will be generated as it exits *GoGetta*”.

Historically the *GoGetta* division accounts for about 45% of assets but with lower debts so about 60-65% of Shareholder's Equity is invested in this division. *GoGetta*, however, has contributed only 25-30% of group earnings.

The *Silver Chef* Hospitality business therefore offers a return on equity 4-4½ times greater than *GoGetta*.

The company will then focus upon its more profitable *Silver Chef* branded Hospitality business and will invest to accelerate the development of technology over the next three years to support efficiency and growth in this division.

The Hospitality division experienced two large bad debts over the last half year and is also making a general provision of \$4.8 million. This is pretty standard Accounting policy: If the accounts are going to show a loss, then makes some extra provisions and report a *bigger* loss! Those provisions can be reversed at a later date (or anticipate higher provisions that would be needed in the future) and allow a *higher* profit to be reported in the future. This policy helps management achieve a profit recovery!

Benjamin Graham's imaginary investor “Mr Market” is a manic depressive investor. Or as Warren Buffet writes “*This imaginary person out there - Mr Market - is kind of a drunken psycho. Some days he gets very enthused, some days he get very depressed. And when*

he gets really enthused you sell to him and when he gets depressed you buy from him”.

“Mr Market” has depressed the Silver Chef share price 40% since the announcement! There will be some short term costs and losses as a result of running down the *GoGetta* business and this will reduce total assets (i.e. financing) by about 40% - so the business will shrink slightly in the short to medium term. But the run down in the *GoGetta* business will repay all of its interest bearing loans *and* release large amounts of cash/capital which can be re-invested more profitably in the *Silver Chef* Hospitality business. This should maximise growth and profitability over the medium to long term.

One of the best ways to evaluate this type of situation is to look at any on-market trades by *insiders* (i.e. the people who know the business best). In the week of the announcement and the fall in the share price, four directors have made relatively large share purchases on-market. In the week of the announcement SA Mitchell spent \$18,977 (4194 shares at \$4.52) to lift her holding to 35,000 shares, PJL Tapper invested \$49,339 (11,000 shares at \$4.49) to double his holding to 22,032 shares, A Kemp invested \$263,516 (57,000 shares at \$4.62) and \$69,663 (14,000 shares at \$4.98) to lift his holding to 980,009 shares (Note: Multiple trades by a director over the same week are considered *one trade* for our insider statistics) and B King spent \$49,443 (10,000 shares at \$4.94) to lift his holding to 123,302 shares.

Last week there were two further insider buys. A Kemp invested a further \$46,243 (10,000 shares at \$4.62) taking his holding to 990,009 shares, while the Founder and Chairman Allan English spent \$50,187 (11,457 shares at \$4.38) to lift his holding to 8,852,798 shares.

All five directors (who are not professional investors with large share portfolios) have, in total, spent over half a million dollars of their own money adding to their investments in Silver Chef shares. Directors are the most *knowledgeable* investors (and usually not “drunken psychos”) so regular investors would do well to copy their *actions*.

The current decline in the Silver Chef share price therefore offers an attractive buying opportunity to add to this investment! “Buy”.

The company is forecasting a full year *loss* of \$9-12 million - which implies a *small* net profit of \$1.1-4.1 million over the second half.

Silver Chef



The Reject Shop has reported a first half very similar to the previous year:

Six Months to 31/12/2017			
	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$437.6m	\$433.0m	+1.1%
Net Profit	\$17.7m	\$17.5m	+1.1%
Net Cash Surplus	\$39.5m	\$39.5m	-
Earnings per share	61.4c	60.7c	+1.1%
Dividends per share	24.0c	24.0c	-

The difference is that the second half year to June 2017 was very difficult for The Reject Shop (resulting in no final dividend) but this year the directors appear more confident and an “improved second half profitability” is expected. Note, of course, that the second half usually operates at a very small loss. The full year profit is expected to be \$16.5-17.5 million (up from \$12.3 million in 2017).

An *Energy Optimisation Project* has been “fully implemented across 250 stores” with electricity usage per store reduced by over 30%. The new Melbourne Distribution Centre is delivering the expected efficiency gains.

A Hong Kong product sourcing office was opened in October 2017, with most benefits expected in the next financial year (i.e. to June 2019).

The Reject Shop



Village Roadshow produced a break-even result (i.e. a trading profit of just \$40,000) for the half year to 31 December 2017 but still produced a small cash operating surplus:

Six Months to 31/12/2017			
	Latest	Previous	Change
Revenues	\$515.2m	\$558.4m	-5.0%
Net Profit	\$0.040m	\$19.1m	-99.8%
Net Cash Surplus	\$14.1m	\$64.4m	-78.2%
Earnings per share	Nil	11.8c	-99.8%
Dividends per share	Nil	Nil	-

In addition there was a \$154.0 million gain on the sale of a Singapore business. The sale and leaseback (with options to repurchase) of land realised \$101.5 million in cash. These two transactions have helped reduce interest bearing debts to \$381.0 million (down from \$627.5 million a year ago).

The sale of land for \$101.5 million produced a gain of \$73.7 million above its original cost. This is being treated as “unearned revenue”. The lease is for an initial term of 30 years with 10 year renewals out to 90 years, but Village Roadshow also has “a number of repurchase options at various points throughout the contractual term”. The accounting treatment has “assumed the land will be repurchased after 25 years” so the \$73.7 million deferred gain will be amortised “over the 25 year assumed lease term”.

Village Roadshow



Company Review: Stellar Resources

Stellar Resources (code SRZ).

Stellar Resources is a very small exploration company with plans to open the *Heemskirk* tin mine in the near future. The development of this project over the next 2-3 years could lift the share price around 15-fold in value.

Company History

Stellar Resources listed in 2005 after an initial public offering at 20 cents per share to search for Iron ore, Zinc, Copper and Gold, Tin and Nickel plus Oil and Gas . . . and later Uranium.

In 2008 the company agreed to purchase a 60% interest in the *Heemskirk Tin* deposit and to acquire the

remaining 40% when it floated its Tin interests in a separate company, **Colombus Metals**. That proposed float was cancelled and in November 2011, the remaining 40% of the project was acquired in return for 43,528,743 Stellar Resources shares. Since then, the company has mainly focused upon the development of this project.

The Heemskirk Tin Project

The *Heemskirk* deposit consists of a resource of 6.35 million tonnes at 1.13% Tin, or 72,000 tonnes of tin. 64% of this resource is in the *Lower Queen Hill* deposit which will be mined first. There is “significant exploration potential”.

(Continued on Page 12)

Company Review: Stellar Resources

(Continued from Page 11)

This deposit is just 18km from **Renison Bell Tin Mine**, Australia's oldest and largest Tin mine. Renison started mining in 1965 with a five year mine life and a resource of 25,000 tonnes of Tin. It has since produced 250,000 tonnes of Tin and has a current resource of 166,000 tonnes.

A *Preliminary Feasibility Study* (PFS) of the *Heemskirk* project in July 2013 estimated a US\$114 million capital cost to produce 4327 tonnes of tin in concentrate annually over a 7 year mine life. This project would have a pre-tax Net Present Value of US\$46 million (A\$61 million) at a tin price of US\$25,500 per tonne.

An Optimised PFS in November 2015 slightly improved the project economics.

A Fast Start scoping study in September 2016 significantly improved the project economics, based on a lower initial capital cost, with a modular smaller processing plant, and one-third of the annual throughput with mining and processing of the initial resources extended from seven years to 20 years mine life. The Fast Start capital cost will be around US\$77 million and the Net Present Value US\$69 million (A\$99 million). The initial capital cost will be repaid in three years. All of these estimates will be updated in the Definitive Feasibility study due in the September 2018 quarter.

This NPV is "highly sensitive to grade and tonnage". A 5% improvement in Tin grade would add \$26 million or 26% to the project NPV. A 30% increase in mining inventory would add a similar \$26 million (26%) to the NPV.

The *Fast Start* smaller scale mining is also expected to lower long term exploration costs by allowing exploration drilling from underground rather than from the surface. The deposits are all "open at depth".

Current drilling will continue through to the March 2018 quarter, with resources modelling and mining studies to be completed in the June 2018 quarter. During the June and September quarters the company will prepare a Definitive Feasibility Study and arrange project financing. Mine construction is planned to begin in the December 2018 quarter with first production by the June 2019 quarter.

Other Tin Projects

Stellar Resources owns other tin exploration interests in the region that could provide synergies with the *Heemskirk* project. Most significant is the acquisition in January 2018 of an exploration licence containing the *Razorback* and *Grand Prize* historical tin mines, a tailings dam and several exploration interests, all just 10km from *Heemskirk*. The company sees potential to use "modern processing technology" to improve recovery from the tailings dam and will create a 3D model and JORC 2012 compliant minerals resource for the *Razorback* mine using historical drilling data to identify potential new exploration drilling targets. This, and samples from the tailing dam and across the *Razorback* pit, will be collected and analysed by the end of this month.

Ore Pre-Sorting Technology

Ore pre-sorting technology has advanced significantly over recent years. X-ray sorting can "separate high density tin bearing particles from waste". This can remove hard silicates and reduce grinding costs and potentially "reduce downstream reagent use".

The results of the company's second round of ore sorting was reported last month, using "highly mineralised" and "waste rock" from recent exploration drilling. Maximising tin recovery at 94%, the ore mass was reduced by 37%, lifting the tin grade from 1.3% to 1.9%. Accepting a lower 90% tin recovery the mass was reduced by 50% and the tin grade increased to 2.2%. Maximising the ore mass reduction to 57% still recovered 87% of the tin and increased the grade to 2.5%.

The company will now optimise this using a larger sample and also monitor results at the neighbouring Renison mine which has similar ore types and is installing sorting technology to treat 900,000 tonnes per annum of ore.

Investment Criteria

Stellar Resources currently have no revenues (except for some interest income) or profits. At 31 December 2017 the company held cash of \$1.7 million (0.44 cent per share) plus listed investments (in **Renascor Resources, UraniumSA** and **Samphire Uranium**) valued at \$101,156.

The issued capital consists of 379,713,489 shares, which at 1.9 cents, gives a market capitalisation of \$7.2 million. In addition there are 59,142,857 share options (code SRZO) to buy shares at 5.0 cents on 18 May 2020.

The major risk at this stage is financing the A\$110 million capital cost of this development. This should be a very profitable project - repaying its initial capital cost in three years. That should enable the company to mainly finance this project with debt, but it is likely that some additional equity capital will also be needed. For a very small \$6 million capitalisation company this could require a relatively large cash issue or placements to outside investors - both of which could dilute the potential returns on the existing shares.

Like most very small companies Stellar Resources is neglected by Brokers and institutional investors.

Three of the four directors own shares in the company and over the last year there have been four *insider* buys (and no sells).

In March 2017 Chairman PG Harman bought 500,000 shares on-market at 3.6 cents and in May 2017 purchased 1,000,000 shares at 2.5 cents to lift his holding to 1,779,704 shares.

In May 2017, the Managing Director, PG Blight, bought 955,325 shares on-market at 2.4 cents to increase his holding to 3,000,000 shares.

In May 2017, Non-Executive Director TH Whiting purchased 1,010,000 shares on-market at 2.5 cents to lift his holding to 2,000,000 shares.

The shares have been very volatile, falling to a low of 1.1 cents in February 2016 before rising to a peak of 5.6 cents in December 2016. The shares then fell to a low of 1.2 cents in October 2017. The shares hit a high of 2.1 cents last month and recent low of 1.5 cents.

Summary and Recommendation

“Neglect” Ratings of Australian Shares

“Neglected” Shares = 0-2 Brokers, “Moderately Followed” Shares = 3-9 Brokers, “Widely Followed” Shares = 10 or more Brokers.

Company	No. of Brokers Following Company	Market Capitalisation (\$ Mill.)	Company	No. of Brokers Following Company	Market Capitalisation (\$ Mill.)	Company	No. of Brokers Following Company	Market Capitalisation (\$ Mill.)	Company	No. of Brokers Following Company	Market Capitalisation (\$ Mill.)
1300 Smiles Ltd	3	157	Billabong Int'l	1	188	Estia Health	5	904	Korvest Ltd	1	25
360 Capital Grp	2	209	Bingo Indust.	4	1,097	Eureka Group	2	62	LendLease Group	11	10,424
3P Learning	3	215	Bionomics Ltd	5	234	Event Hospital.	5	2,135	LifeHealthCare	2	161
A.P. Eagers	5	1,674	Blackmores Ltd	7	2,255	Evolution Min.	13	4,858	Lifestyle Com.	2	529
AFT Pharma.	2	203	Bluescope Steel	8	8,519	Experience Co	2	381	Link Admin.	8	4,162
AGL Energy Ltd	11	14,271	Blue Sky Alt In	4	846	FAR Ltd	5	459	Liq Natural Gas	1	229
ALS Limited	11	3,595	Bluglass Ltd	2	145	Factor Thera.	1	34	Livetiles Ltd	3	189
AMA Group Ltd	5	619	Boart Longyear	1	263	Fairfax Media	10	1,621	Lovisa Holdings	6	958
AMP Ltd	13	15,847	Boral Limited	11	9,050	Fiducial Group	2	159	Lucapa Diamond	1	77
ANZ Bank	15	83,145	Brambles Ltd	10	14,989	Finders Res.	2	175	MG Unit Trust	2	187
APA Group	12	8,892	Breville Group	8	1,626	Fleetwood Corp	2	162	MMA Offshore	4	189
APN Outdoor Grp	10	745	Brickworks Ltd	6	2,343	Flexicorp Ltd	7	636	MNF Group	4	390
ARB Corporation	7	1,556	C.S.R. Ltd	12	2,728	Flight Centre	12	5,421	MYOB Group	12	1,877
ASX Limited	13	11,252	CBL Corporation	1	665	Folkestone Ltd	1	178	MacMahon Hold	1	506
AUB Group	3	824	CIMIC Group	7	15,013	Folkestone Educ	4	715	Mac Limited	3	375
AV Jennings	2	294	CSG Ltd	1	100	Fortescue Metal	18	14,791	Macquarie Group	14	35,895
AVEO Group	6	1,562	CSL Limited	11	74,059	Freelancer Ltd	2	222	Macquarie Atlas	4	3,791
AWE Limited	10	591	Cabcharge Ltd	2	212	Freedom Insur.	2	96	Macquarie C Tel	1	355
Abacus Property	3	2,016	Caltex Australia	10	8,706	Freedom Foods	1	1,010	Magellan Fin Gp	10	4,377
Accent Group	3	578	Cann Group	1	310	G.U.D. Holdings	8	1,003	Magnis Resource	1	260
Aconex Limited	7	1,562	Capital Health	3	217	G8 Education	10	1,256	Mantra Group	11	1,172
Acruz Ltd	2	26	Capilano Honey	2	162	GBST Holdings	6	158	Matrix Comp.	1	46
Adairs Limited	4	332	Carbonxt Group	1	303	GDI Property	2	668	Maxi TRANS	2	134
Adelaide Bright	12	4,500	Cardno Ltd	2	671	GPT Group	13	8,605	Mayne Pharma Gr	6	1,136
Ainsworth Game	7	656	Carindale Prop	2	527	GR Engineering	1	238	McGrath Limited	1	60
Airxpanders Inc	1	138	Carsales.com	16	3,657	GWA Group Ltd	8	834	McMillan Shake.	7	1,462
Alacer Gold	5	197	Cash Converters	1	200	Galaxy Res.	9	1,238	McPherson's Ltd	1	139
Ale Property	3	967	Catapult Group	4	234	Garda Div Prop	1	108	Medical Dev Int	2	463
Alexium Int'l	1	92	Cedar Woods Prp	2	483	Gascoyne Res.	1	206	Medibank Priv.	12	8,703
Alkane Explor.	1	159	Centuria Indust	2	628	Gateway Life.	6	592	Medusa Mining	2	108
Alliance Aviat.	4	209	Centuria Metro.	4	558	Genworth Mort.	5	1,199	Megaport Ltd	2	425
Altium Limited	5	2,799	Challenger Ltd	14	7,596	Goodman Group	11	15,270	Melbourne IT	2	387
Altona Mining	1	67	Chart H Retail	10	1,534	Graincorp	9	1,900	Mesoblast Ltd	4	795
Altura Mining	3	673	Charter Hall GR	9	2,734	Greencross Ltd	8	647	Metals X Ltd	4	520
Alumina Ltd	12	6,652	Citadel Group	4	332	Growthpoint Pro	4	2,229	Metcash Ltd	11	3,093
Amaysim Aust.	2	276	Class Limited	7	312	HT&E Limited	7	545	Metro Mining	1	374
Ancor Ltd	10	16,666	Cleanaway Waste	3	2,969	HUB24 Limited	5	650	Metro Per Glass	5	148
Aneka Tambang	3	1	Clearview Wlth	1	968	Hansen Tech.	4	852	Michael Hill	5	442
Ansell Ltd	9	3,743	Clean Teq Hold.	4	768	Harvey Norman	10	4,187	Migme Limited	1	14
Apiam Animal H	2	82	Clinuvel Pharm.	1	425	Healthscope	10	3,424	Millennium Min.	1	173
Appen Limited	6	1,001	Clover Corp.	1	112	Helloworld Trav	5	575	Millennium Serv	1	45
Ardent Leisure	9	897	Coca Cola Amatil	12	6,693	Highfield Res.	2	296	Mineral Res.	5	3,197
Arena REIT	3	613	Cochlear Ltd	11	10,820	Hotel Property	4	431	Mineral Deposit	3	226
Aristocrat Leis	12	15,798	Codan Ltd	1	431	Huon Aquacult.	4	394	Mirvac Group	13	8,090
Asaleo Care Ltd	5	722	Cogstate Ltd	2	101	IDP Education	7	1,842	Mitula Group	1	93
Asia Pac Data C	2	228	Collins Foods	5	600	IMF Bentham Ltd	1	436	Monadelphous Gr	11	1,392
Aspen Group Ltd	1	102	Collection Hse	6	173	IOOF Holdings	12	3,844	Monash IVF Grp	4	274
Atlas Iron Ltd	1	232	Com'wealth Bank	14	134,732	IPH Limited	6	687	Money3 Corp Ltd	3	296
Aurelia Metals	1	317	Compuedics Ltd	1	62	IRESS Limited	7	1,717	Mortgage Choice	2	275
Aurizon Hold.	11	8,747	Computershare	13	9,697	Icar Asia Ltd	1	98	Motorcycle Hold	2	162
AusNet Services	12	6,054	Cooper Energy	2	496	Iluka Resources	12	4,451	Mt Gibson Iron	2	417
Ausdrill Ltd	4	995	Corp Travel M.	7	2,643	Imdex Limited	2	436	Murray River Or	2	35
Aust Pharm. Ind	5	771	Costa Group	5	2,375	Impedimed Ltd	3	278	Myer Holdings	10	357
Aust Finance Gr	2	361	Credit Corp	7	998	Incitec Pivot	11	6,386	Mystate Ltd	3	426
Austal Limited	3	631	Cromwell Prop.	7	2,051	Independ. Group	15	2,840	NRW Holdings	2	630
Aust Agriculit.	1	732	Crown Resorts	9	9,148	Industria REIT	5	417	Nanosonics Ltd	4	805
Austin Eng.	2	148	Cybg plc	16	4,224	Infigen Energy	5	568	Nat Veterinary	3	152
Aust Vintage	1	168	Cynata Therap.	2	107	Infomedia Ltd	3	261	Nat'l Aust Bank	16	82,366
Auswide Bank	2	214	DWS Limited	1	196	Ingenia Com Grp	3	558	National Stor.	7	861
Automotive Hold	11	1,254	Dacian Gold Ltd	5	607	Inghams Group	9	1,395	Navitas Ltd	9	1,780
Aventus Retail	4	1,056	Danakali Ltd	2	180	Insurance Aust.	12	19,153	Navigator GI In	3	577
BHP Billiton	19	90,955	Data 3 Ltd	2	279	Int Research	3	683	Nearmap Ltd	4	387
BSA Ltd	2	144	Decmil Group	1	208	Integral Diag.	4	300	Neometals Ltd	1	193
BT Invest Mgmt	12	3,449	Dexus	12	9,655	Investa Office	10	2,549	NetComm Wire.	4	188
BUBS Australia	2	303	Domain Holdings	11	1,747	Invocare Ltd	9	1,562	Netwealth Group	4	1,723
BWP Trust	8	1,921	Domino's Pizza	12	3,829	Iron Mountain	4	2,053	Neuren Pharm.	1	308
BWX Limited	7	652	Donaco Inter'l	1	195	Iselect Limited	4	252	New Energy Sol.	1	467
Baby Bunting Gr	4	179	Doray Minerals	2	113	Isentia Group	5	190	New Hope Corp.	4	1,812
Bank of Q'land	14	4,644	Downer EDI Ltd	8	3,931	Ive Group	3	330	New Century Res	1	449
Bapcor Limited	5	1,644	Dulux Group Ltd	9	3,021	JB Hi-Fi Ltd	13	3,019	Newcrest Mining	16	16,569
Base Resources	3	321	EML Payments	4	336	James Hardie	10	9,983	News Corp.	6	1,041
Beacon Lighting	3	363	ERM Power Ltd	3	463	Janus Henderson	11	3,993	Nextdc Limited	10	1,941
Beach Energy	12	2,822	Eclixp Group	8	1,144	Japara Health.	5	497	Nib Holdings	11	3,166
Beadell Res.	6	116	Elders Limited	4	799	Jumbo Interact.	1	198	Nick Scali Ltd	4	561
Bega Cheese Ltd	5	1,292	Ellex Medical	1	101	K2 Asset Mgmt	1	46	Nine Entertain.	8	2,022
Bellamy's Aust.	5	2,317	Emeco Holdings	3	845	Kardoon Gas	5	284	Nthn Star Res.	15	3,951
Bendigo Bank	14	5,179	Enero Group Ltd	1	89	Kidman Res Ltd	3	697	Nufarm Limited	12	2,758
Berkeley Energy	1	221	Equity Trustees	2	426	Kogan.com Ltd	1	820	OFX Group	3	336

Company	No. of Brokers Following Company	Market Capitalisation (\$ Mill.)	Company	No. of Brokers Following Company	Market Capitalisation (\$ Mill.)	Company	No. of Brokers Following Company	Market Capitalisation (\$ Mill.)	Company	No. of Brokers Following Company	Market Capitalisation (\$ Mill.)
OZ Minerals Ltd	12	2,787	Qantm I.P.	1	155	Shaver Shop Grp	2	61	The Reject Shop	4	215
Oceania Health.	4	571	Qube Holdings	9	3,770	Shine Corporate	1	120	Think Childcare	4	89
Oil Search Ltd	15	10,787	RCR Tomlinson	4	699	Shopping Centre	8	1,716	Thorn Group Ltd	2	130
Onewue Holdings	4	206	REA Group Ltd	14	10,581	Shriro Holdings	1	129	Tox Free Sol.	6	667
Onview Health.	2	111	RXP Services	2	79	Sigma Health.	6	955	Transurban Grp	9	26,341
Ooh!Media	8	759	Ramelius Res.	1	235	Silver Lake Res	2	179	Treasury Wine	11	12,692
Opthea Limited	2	120	Ramsay Health	10	12,955	Silver Chef Ltd	3	161	Trilogy Int'l	2	190
Orica Ltd	11	7,113	Range Intern'l	1	9	Sims Metal Mgmt	8	3,238	Universal Coal	1	112
Origin Energy	12	15,018	Reckon Limited	3	162	Sino Gas & En.	4	381	Vicinity Centre	12	9,563
Orocobre Ltd	11	1,483	Red River Res.	3	154	Sirtex Medical	7	1,538	Villa World Ltd	3	314
Orora Limited	10	4,127	Redbubble Ltd	2	397	Smartgroup Corp	7	1,417	Village Road.	8	544
Osprey Medical	2	85	Redflow Limited	1	73	Somnomed Ltd	2	193	Viralitics Ltd	2	403
Over The Wire	3	131	Reece Limited	2	5,229	Sonic Health	10	10,150	Virgin Aust	5	1,988
PMP Limited	1	153	Regeneus Ltd	1	23	Soul Pattinson	1	4,165	Virtus Health	5	459
PWR Holdings	2	235	Regis Health.	6	1,187	South32 Limited	17	16,578	Vista Group	3	428
Pacific Energy	2	199	Regis Resources	15	2,234	Spark Infrastru	7	3,919	Vita Group Ltd	3	229
Pacific Smiles	4	271	Reliance W/wide	8	2,194	Speedcast Int'l	7	1,262	Viva Energy/REIT	4	1,481
Pacific Current	1	319	Resolute Mining	8	879	Spookfish Ltd	1	55	Vocus Group Ltd	15	1,555
Pact Group Hold	8	1,915	Retail Food Grp	2	217	Spotless Group	1	1,235	WPP AUNZ Ltd	3	831
Panoramic Res.	1	221	Reva Medical	1	146	St Barbara Ltd	6	2,072	Wagners Hold.	3	681
Pantoro Limited	2	228	Rhipe Limited	3	124	Star Entertain.	11	4,541	Watpac Ltd	1	138
Paragon Care	2	165	Ridley Corp.	5	446	Starpharma Hold	1	502	Webjet NL	6	1,483
Paringa Res Ltd	4	111	Rio Tinto Ltd	15	30,436	Steadfast Group	7	2,157	Wellard Limited	2	74
Peet Ltd	3	701	Rural Funds Grp	2	544	Sth Cross Media	7	815	Wellcom Group	3	180
Peninsula En.	4	69	Ruralco Hold.	3	322	Stockland	12	9,957	Wesfarmers Ltd	13	46,397
Perpetual Ltd	12	2,400	SG Fleet Group	5	965	Suncorp Group	12	18,002	Western Areas	15	827
Perseus Mining	8	434	Sandfire Res.	16	1,205	Sundance Energy	1	90	Westgold Res.	2	554
Pilbara Mineral	6	1,432	Santos Ltd	15	10,185	Sunland Group	2	270	West African R.	3	227
Pioneer Credit	3	215	Saracen Mineral	8	1,394	Superloop Ltd	4	489	Westpac Banking	4	102,432
Platinum Asset	9	3,585	Scentre Group	13	20,871	Super Retail Gr	12	1,339	Westfield Corp.	9	18,079
Polynovo Ltd	1	294	Scottish Pac.	3	418	Sydney Airport	12	15,209	Whitehaven Coal	16	4,320
Praemium Ltd	6	262	Sealink Travel	3	393	Syrah Resources	6	974	Wisetech Global	8	3,066
Premier Invest	11	2,172	Seek Ltd	14	7,294	TPG Telecom Ltd	12	5,679	Woodside Petrol	16	25,751
Primary Health	10	2,051	Select harvest	8	539	TPI Enterprises	1	105	Woolworths Grp	13	35,098
Prime Media Grp	1	115	Senex Energy	8	550	Tabcorp Holding	9	9,469	Worley Group	10	3,989
Pro Medicus Ltd	2	876	Senetas Corp	2	130	Talisman Mining	1	43	XRF Scientific	1	26
PropertyLink	4	591	Servcorp Ltd	2	485	Tassal Group	6	678	Xenith IP Group	4	104
Q.B.E. Insur.	13	13,528	Service Stream	2	597	Tawana Resource	1	217	Yowie Group Ltd	2	21
QMS Media	2	319	Seven West Med.	8	890	Technology One	6	1,641	Zip Co Ltd	2	230
Qantas Airways	9	10,418	Seven Group	5	5,694	Telstra	16	40,913			

Short Interest in Australian Shares

Company	Short Interest Ratio	Market Capitalisation (\$ Mill.)	Company	Short Interest Ratio	Market Capitalisation (\$ Mill.)	Company	Short Interest Ratio	Market Capitalisation (\$ Mill.)	Company	Short Interest Ratio	Market Capitalisation (\$ Mill.)
1-Page Ltd	0.9%	25	Altura Mining	0.8%	673	BWP Trust	2.3%	1,921	Buru Energy Ltd	1.1%	136
3P Learning	0.0%	215	Alumina Ltd	2.4%	6,652	BWX Limited	7.9%	652	C.S.R. Ltd	5.2%	2,728
A.P. Eagers	0.0%	1,674	Amaysim Aust.	3.2%	276	Baby Bunting Gr	1.1%	179	CIMIC Group	0.1%	15,013
ACN004410833	1.5%	65	Amcor Ltd	1.0%	16,666	Bank of Q'land	2.9%	4,644	CSG Ltd	1.5%	100
AGL Energy Ltd	1.0%	14,271	Ansell Ltd	3.8%	3,743	Bapcor Limited	7.7%	1,644	CSL Limited	0.6%	74,059
ALS Limited	1.0%	3,595	Anson Resources	0.1%	71	Barra Resources	0.0%	22	Cabcharge Ltd	4.2%	212
AMA Group Ltd	1.9%	619	Appen Limited	0.4%	1,001	Base Resources	0.4%	321	Caltex Australia	0.4%	8,706
AMP Ltd	2.2%	15,847	Ardea Resources	0.0%	115	Beacon Lighting	0.0%	363	Cann Group	0.1%	310
ANZ Bank	0.9%	83,145	Ardent Leisure	9.5%	897	Beach Energy	2.1%	2,822	Cape Lambert R.	0.0%	49
APA Group	2.3%	8,892	Arena REIT	0.0%	613	Beadell Res.	4.0%	116	Cardno Ltd	0.2%	671
APN Outdoor Grp	9.1%	745	Argosy Minerals	0.0%	299	Bega Cheese Ltd	5.2%	1,292	Cardinal Res.	0.2%	206
ARB Corporation	1.5%	1,556	Aristocrat Leis	1.0%	15,798	Bellamy's Aust.	0.9%	2,317	Camarvon Pet.	0.0%	144
ASX Limited	1.5%	11,252	Arrow Minerals	0.0%	8	Bendigo Bank	7.1%	5,179	Carsales.com	1.5%	3,657
AV Jennings	0.0%	294	Artimis Res.	0.3%	119	Berkeley Energy	0.1%	221	Cash Converters	0.1%	200
AVEO Group	2.4%	1,562	Asaleo Care Ltd	3.2%	722	Beston Glb Food	0.0%	94	Catapult Group	2.7%	234
AWELimited	0.4%	591	Atlas Iron Ltd	0.1%	232	Big Un Limited	0.3%	382	Cedar Woods Prp	0.3%	483
Abacus Property	0.9%	2,016	Aurizon Hold.	1.1%	8,747	Billabong Int'l	0.4%	188	Centuria Indust	0.3%	628
Accent Group	3.1%	578	AusCann Group	0.2%	230	Bingo Indust.	3.3%	1,097	Centuria Metro.	0.0%	558
Aconex Limited	1.1%	1,562	AusNet Services	2.0%	6,054	Birimian Ltd	0.0%	127	Challenger Ltd	2.6%	7,596
AcruX Ltd	0.8%	26	Ausdrill Ltd	0.2%	995	Blackham Res.	0.1%	103	Champion Iron	0.0%	488
Adacel Tech.	0.0%	180	Aust Pharm. Ind	3.7%	771	Blackmores Ltd	4.5%	2,255	Chart Hall Long	0.4%	899
Adairs Limited	0.1%	332	Aust Mines Ltd	0.2%	268	Bluescope Steel	0.1%	8,519	Chart H Retail	4.1%	1,534
Adelaide Bright	5.2%	4,500	Aust Careers N.	0.3%	287	Blue Sky Alt In	3.8%	846	Charter Hall GR	0.8%	2,734
Admedus Limited	0.0%	69	Austal Limited	0.7%	631	Boart Longyear	0.0%	263	Class Limited	0.5%	312
Afterpay Touch	6.4%	1,285	Aust Agricult.	9.3%	732	Boral Limited	1.7%	9,050	Cleanaway Waste	0.6%	2,969
Ainsworth Game	2.0%	656	Automotive Hold	5.9%	1,254	Boss Resources	0.2%	49	Clean Teq Hold.	1.6%	768
Airxpanders Inc	0.1%	138	Autosports Grp	0.5%	392	Brainchip Hold.	0.1%	170	Cobalt Blue	0.1%	63
Alacer Gold	0.6%	197	Avanco Res.	0.0%	192	Brambles Ltd	1.0%	14,989	CocaCola Amatil	2.2%	6,693
Ale Property	0.5%	967	Aventus Retail	0.2%	1,056	Bravura Sol.	0.7%	518	Cochlear Ltd	0.6%	10,820
Alexium Int'l	0.0%	92	BCI Minerals	0.1%	63	Breville Group	0.1%	1,626	Collins Foods	0.6%	600
Alkane Explor.	0.1%	159	BHP Billiton	2.2%	90,955	Brickworks Ltd	0.4%	2,343	Collection Hse	4.0%	173
Alliance Aviat.	0.1%	209	BT Invest Mgmt	0.8%	3,449	Buddy Platform	0.9%	90	Com'wealth Bank	1.5%	134,732
Altium Limited	0.2%	2,799	BUBS Australia	0.3%	303	Bulletproof Grp	0.1%	22	Computershare	1.4%	9,697

Investment Outlook*(Continued from Page 1)*

skewed to the right, there are disagreements as to how it should be applied in share selection. One recent *Index Investment Strategy* article produced by **S&P Dow Jones Indices** concludes “The logic of skewed returns is that it is more sensible to focus on excluding the least desirable than on picking the most desirable” (emphasis from the original article) - the opposite of what an investment manager will do.

Maybe your Editor's brain is wired a little differently, but he struggles to see the obvious “logic” in that statement.

A lot of companies *could* become big winners *if* they are successful at developing and commercialising their technology (e.g. AtCor, Acrux, Cynata, Ellex, Fastbrick, Integrated Research, Prophecy) or successful with a new way of running a business (e.g. Iluka, Michael Hill, OZ Minerals, Silver Chef, Village Roadshow). If, for any number of reasons they fail, they could be big losers (but, of course, that loss is strictly limited).

So do we pick these shares as the potentially “most desirable” or exclude them as the potentially “least desirable”?

To Your Editor's mind *the logic of skewed returns* makes it more dangerous to make an error *excluding* undesirable shares (i.e. excluding a share we should have owned) than to make an error picking desirable shares (i.e. to invest in a share that we should have avoided). That suggests we should continue to focus on “picking (potential) winners”, not on “excluding the least desirable”.

Of course, the type of share we do feel safer to *exclude* are the “average companies” - the ones that are very similar to others, that may not fail but probably won't ever do anything great. Typically a mature “blue chip” share may fall into this category - and we are more than happy not owning Banks and Telecoms and Utilities. These shares are neither the “least desirable” nor the “most desirable”.

If we exclude an undesirable share then at best we avoid a maximum loss of 100%, but if we are wrong and it turns out to be a depressed, out-of-favour, business that just could not get any worse... and recovers 10-fold in value (or more) then we have made a costly error. Let's say there is an 80% chance it becomes worthless and only a 20% chance it recovers. The *expected return* will be +100% (i.e. $[80\% \times -100\% = -80\%] + [20\% \times +900\% = +180\%]$).

Even though this share will become worthless 80% of the time, we will do better to *include* it in a diversified portfolio than to *exclude* it. (Of course, what we really want is to find 10 or 20 or 30 of these types of companies - and make a very small investment in each one - so that about 80% can fail and 20% can succeed and we achieve that expected +100% *average return*.)

So, consistently over the last 37 years, our *Investment Strategy* has been to select shares with the potential to appreciate many-fold in value over many years, and to patiently hold a well diversified portfolio of these shares over the medium to long term. So far that seems to be working out OK.

Dividend\$

Company	Cents per Share	Ex-Date	Pay-able	Tax Credit
Air New Zealand	11.00	09-03	16-03	Full
Barramundi Ltd	1.38	15-03	29-03	-
CDL Investments	3.50	04-05	18-05	Full
Chorus Ltd	9.00	20-03	17-04	Full
Colonial Motor Company	15.00	06-04	16-04	Full
Contact Energy	13.00	16-03	06-04	Full
Ebos Group	33.00	16-03	06-04	3.2083
Freightways Ltd	14.50	16-03	03-04	Full
Heartland Bank	3.50	16-03	03-04	Full
Marlin Global	1.93	15-03	29-03	Nil
Marsden Marine	6.75	16-03	23-03	Full
Methven Ltd	4.00	16-03	29-03	Nil
Mercury NZ	6.00	15-03	03-04	Full
Metlifecare	3.25	15-03	29-03	Nil
NZ King Salmon	2.00	15-03	23-03	Full
NZ Refining Company	12.00	15-03	22-03	Full
NZME Ltd	6.00	18-04	03-05	Full
NZX Ltd	3.10	09-03	23-03	Full
PGG Wrightson	1.75	16-03	05-04	Full
Property For Industry	2.15	26-02	07-03	-
Seeka Group	12.00	16-03	23-03	Full
Skellerup Holdings	4.00	09-03	22-03	Full
Sky TV Network	7.50	15-03	23-03	Full
Spark NZ	11.00	16-03	06-04	Full
Spark NZ special	1.50	16-03	06-04	Full
Steel & Tube Holdings	7.00	15-03	29-03	Full
Summerset Group	7.10	09-03	22-03	Nil
T&G Global	6.00	30-03	06-04	Full
Tourism Holdings	13.00	04-04	16-04	2.5278
TradeMe Group	9.10	09-03	20-03	Full
Vista Group	1.7365	12-03	23-03	Full
Vital Healthcare Prop	2.125	15-03	29-03	0.1543
Warehouse Group	10.00	03-04	12-04	Full
Australian Shares				
Finbar Group	3.00	27-02	12-04	
Iluka Resources	25.00	27-03	23-04	
Integrated Research	3.00	27-02	10-04	
McMillan Shakespeare	33.00	15-03	29-03	
Melbourne IT	7.50	05-04	30-04	
Michael Hill International	2.50	14-03	29-03	
OZ Minerals	14.00	09-03	26-03	
Reckon Ltd	3.00	21-02	10-03	
Silver Chef	10.00	05-04	20-04	
The Reject Shop	24.00	16-03	09-04	

Next Issue:

The next issue of *Market Analysis* will be emailed in five weeks time on Monday April 16, 2018.

The print version will be delivered later that week, depending upon printing and postal delivery times.

MARKET ANALYSIS is published 12 times per year by Securities Research Company Limited, 3/47 Boyce Ave, Mt Roskill, Auckland. Subscribe online at www.stockmarket.co.nz or email james@stockmarket.co.nz.

Readers are advised that they should not assume that every recommendation made in the future will be profitable or equal the performance of recommendations made in the past. A summary of all prior recommendations is published on the website. The information presented has been obtained from original and published sources believed to be reliable, but its accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

The entire contents are copyright. Reproduction in whole or part is strictly forbidden without the approval of the publisher.